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Abstract: This study fleshes out the role that may play the Arab revolution in strengthening 
regional integration. It rigorously assesses the extent of change in the degree of financial 
interdependence among Arab Monarchies (i.e., Arab Gulf countries, Jordan and Morocco) 
with the onset of the Arab Spring events. Our results reveal a significant time-varying 
volatility spillover effects, highlighting a greater interdependency across the focal Arab stock 
markets.  It is also well shown that compared to the Morocco, there is a higher degree of 
financial integration of Jordan vis-à-vis the Gulf countries. Notably, a different integration 
patterns arises when accounting for the aftermath of revolution. Under the post-uprisings 
period, the stock market correlation between Morocco and Gulf countries increase 
substantially to values as high as the ones of Jordan. This implies that the Arab Spring has 
changed the nature of shock transmission between these countries, and thus may be perceived 
as a revival of integration.  
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1. Introduction 
On December 2010, vegetable vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself in Sidi Bouzid 
in central Tunisia. His suicide has served as an ultimate act of massive protests throughout the 
country. To some extent, Bouazizi‟s self-immolation has sparked a dramatic political 
upheaval among many Middle East and North African countries where the political leaders 
grew cocky and distant over time from their own populations. This event, often known as the 
“Arab Spring”, seems a historic crisis that hits especially the Arab world. With the resounding 
slogans “the people want to bring down the regime” and “leave”, the popular revolution that 
started in Tunisia has spread rapidly like a virus to Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, and has 
led to the fall of leaders in these countries (except Syria). A real revolution has occurred in 
people's minds, through a shift in consciousness: the air of desperation in the past has given 
way to a ray of hopefulness, debunking the idea that freedom and democracy do not suit the 
Arabs. It has morphed then into a contagion that widely affects monarchical systems in 
Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. Revolts and protest movements had taken place also in almost 
all Gulf Council Cooperation (GCC)
4
 states. More precisely, Bahrain and Oman have 
witnessed public protests, whereas the rest of GCC countries have experienced short-lived 
popular movements (especially in Kuwait). With the severe protests worthy observed in Syria, 
Libya, Yemen and Bahrain, the GCC countries have pursued a policy of counter-revolution 
inside the Gulf area and pro-revolution outside it. The central policy objective of the GCC 
was to effectively manage the profound turbulence inside by raising its clout, and to shore up 
heavy friendly regimes outside. In fact, the Arab Spring events of 2011 shook the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region as a whole and brought in its wake unintended 
consequences. If the Gulf and North Africa (excluding Libya and Tunisia) have weathered the 
implications of the Arab uprisings, some new geopolitical risks are emerged resulted in very 
active and careful risk response. Clearly, the GCC countries have demonstrated an apparent 
attachment to maintain the Arab monarchical system of power that serves the interests of 
regional stability and pre-empts Arab spring unrest at home. Specifically, they are increased 
their influence and protection over the monarchical regimes in Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco and 
Oman, which are undergoing periods of profound political and economic transition, through 
an official financial assistance or varied investment channels and via a formal invitation of 
Morocco and Jordan to join the GCC in 2011.  
Creating a “club of monarchies” may have a powerful role in accelerating the financial 
integration across the Arab monarchies. The study of stock market integration which has 
recently received much interest in a variety of literatures, especially in international finance, 
documented that one significant benefit of capital markets integration is that it generally 
diversifies regionally/internationally the country-specific risk and thus improves risk sharing 
across borders (Joost and Luc 2007; Bekaert and Urias 1995; Sorensen et al. 2007; Driessen 
and Laeven 2007). Further, a deeper integration is believed (i) to appropriately respond to the 
challenges that may stem from the uncertain environment and to mitigate potential 
vulnerabilities, (ii) to have benefits in  achieving an effective allocation of capital (Heathcote 
and Perri 2004), (iii) to help better share financial risk by lessening the adverse volatility 
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spillover effects, (iv) to enhance the transparency of risk recognition in the financial system, 
and (v) to reach a sound economic dimension of cooperation. 
Note that the study of financial integration has lacked analysis within MENA region 
and GCC area frameworks. Very few studies have focused on MENA stock markets and 
exclusively on the GCC stock markets by investigating for example their efficiency (Dahel 
and Laabas 1999) or their interactions with oil prices (Maghyereh and Al-Kandari 2007). Our 
research is a first attempt to empirically examine the issue of financial integration across Gulf 
countries, Jordan and Morocco while taking into account the aftermath of the “Arab Spring” 
events. It discusses the implications of these events in term of increasing correlation between 
national financial markets of Arab monarchies (i.e., GCC, Morocco and Jordan) and thus 
improving the opportunities for the Gulf States to boost and diversify their engagement in the 
MENA region and to limit the impact of an unexpected political change. For Jordan and 
Morocco, the current political changes give them the opportunity to tackle their 
socioeconomic structural problems and pave the way for their economic and financial 
integration into Golf countries. Certainly, they have latterly received generous financial aid 
packages from GCC states given that evidence for these two countries suggests that they have 
benefitted from a strong growth in incoming investments (in particular from the Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and the UAE) and financial aid
5
 from GCC states. The GCC membership may offer 
potentially extensive aid and more: trade, investment and oil. Further, expanding GCC 
membership can deepen military cooperation. So, the relationship is perhaps not as one-side 
as it might otherwise appear. 
 The current research attempts to examine the extent of change in the degree of 
financial interdependence among Arab Monarchies since the start of the Arab uprisings. In 
other words, we assess whether a “forced” integration for typically political reasons may 
make sense from an economic point of view. For this purpose, we consider two different 
models. The first one is the DCC-GARCH. In order to incorporate regime shifts into the 
DCC-GARCH model, we also introduce a dynamic correlation -switching Markov model (the 
second model). The Bayesian quantile regression was carried out to ensure the robustness of 
our results (the third model). This is what constitutes the originality of our approach. In the 
last case, we address the endogeneity problem and include relevant control variables to 
estimate the linkage between stock markets of the countries studied. Specifically, the paper 
will seek answers to the following questions: (i) Can the stock markets of the Arab 
monarchies club be safely served as a diversification opportunity for investors? (ii) To what 
extent has the Arab Spring spark high degree of financial market integration in the countries 
studied (i.e., Jordan and Morocco and the GCC members)? (iii) Does the joining the Gulf 
Cooperation Council pose a threat to Morocco, given its strong links with Europe and its 
attempts to set up constitutional reforms, which are far concerns of Gulf countries? (iv) Are 
the newly accessed countries -Jordan and Morocco- having different characteristics (during 
the integration period)? This paper seeks to answer these questions in the broader context of 
the burgeoning literature on the financial integration in developing countries. Providing 
clearer answers to the above questions is crucial to better understanding how the Arab stock 
markets are becoming interdependent and how this integration has been affected by the 2011 
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uprisings. As such, the article proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives a brief survey of the focal 
stock markets. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy. Section 4 reports the main obtained 
findings and discusses them. Section 5 deals with conclusions and some implications. 
 
2. Stock markets in the countries in question: A Brief Survey 
Despite considerable diversity among MENA countries, some broad generalisations 
can be made and explained by their relatively common economic, institutional, political and 
cultural links. First, MENA region is marked by a low level of financial development. While 
the ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP - measure of the financial depth- has increased in the 
MENA region from 56% of GDP in 1990 to 58% in 2006 (pre-crisis level) and 69% in 2013, 
and the domestic credit to private sector from 30 % to 40% of GDP and 35% in 2013, these 
rates remain at less than half their corresponding levels in East Asia. In 2013, bank assets 
accounted for 58% of financial assets in the MENA countries, compared to 66% in emerging 
Asian countries, and 39% in Latin America (IMF 2010, 2014). Second, MENA capital 
markets are small compared to other developing regions and until recently financial systems 
of MENA countries are more dominated by bank system. However, in the recent decade, we 
have noted a certain stock market emergence. Total market capitalization has increased by 
71% between 2008 and 2013 while Bank assets have increased by only 18%. Intuitively, 
although the GCC economies remain dependent on hydrocarbon extraction implying 
heightened vulnerability to the fluctuations of oil and gas prices, they have continued to 
attract foreign investors and are doing relatively better in the financial crisis compared to 
other emerging economies. In fact, despite the GCC financial markets were shaken by the 
financial crisis in Europe and America
6
 since the latter half of 2008, the GCC economies have 
emerged stable from the events of the past years. This can be explained by the fact that all 
GCC member states have sufficient savings to cushion a sizeable shock (IMF 2012) and a 
large Sovereign Wealth Funds who are investing abroad and at home and certainly using as 
political and economical instruments by the GCC states. In the case of Bahrain and Oman 
(Ramady 2013), which have channelled these funds to local projects in order to stimulate their 
domestic economies and generate jobs. Other GCC countries (notably Kuwait, Qatar and 
UAE) use these funds mostly to hedge against domestic economic slowdowns and political 
risks.  
Against the backdrop of an uncertain oil market and the Spring Arab events of 2011, 
the GCC countries are undergoing far-reaching changes on several fronts. First, on the 
economic side, they are forced to achieve sustainable growth by diversifying their non-oil 
tradable sectors and finding other sources of economic growth and export revenues. Within 
this framework, they must be able to deal with the lack of skills and the workforce skill set. 
Second, in term of Gulf States‟ regional and foreign policy, in the 2000s the oil-rich Gulf 
countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE) have opted for a model based on the 
diversification of geopolitical and geo-economic interests and the integration into South-
South frameworks (Ulrichsen 2013). Nevertheless, further actions are still needed to minimize 
possible harmful vulnerabilities and better diversify their economies. 
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Most remarkably, oil-rich Gulf States have deployed larger amounts of aid to 
appropriately respond to the political and economic changes triggered by the onset of “Arab 
spring”. Despite the GCC region remains politically stable, except Bahrain and Oman which 
are the two GCC countries most threatened by uprisings events, the non-GCC Arabic-
speaking countries
7
 are affecting directly or indirectly by regional tensions. It is likely that, 
given the volatility of political regimes in the transition states like Egypt and the prevalence of 
regimes that are not necessarily favourably inclined towards some GCC States, this may have 
been a reason for this trend. These geopolitical risks seem the ever-present peril of GCC states 
(Kern 2012). The 2011 uprisings were sudden, exceptional and youthful. The spontaneity and 
the speed characterizing these events have created bafflement and exceeded expectations. In 
response, in 2011 the Saudi Arabia has offered GCC membership to Jordan and Morocco and 
has announced the implementation of „Gulf Union‟, a step to accelerate the inter-sub-regional 
integration between the GCC and these two monarchical regimes and eventually to prepare 
the future intra-regional trade, bringing wider economic diversification. This is a scenario that 
is very likely to emerge in the short-run. The common market in the region may be a desirable 
way to inter-sub-regional financial integration. 
Looking at the characteristics of the stock markets in these countries, it is clearly 
noticeable that they tended to be strongly differentiated in terms of their size, degree of 
liquidity and stage of liberalization which is mainly due to the institutional framework for 
capital markets and national legislation. It bears to mention that in recent years restructuring 
the ownership and the legal form of Arab exchanges has grown (like the privatisation of the 
Kuwait Stock Exchange and the demutualisation
8
 of the Moroccan Stock Exchange). But, 
currently, the level of institutional investment in Arab capital markets is relatively low, 
reflecting the low level of development of local pension, insurance and mutual funds. 
Likewise, foreign institutional capital (pension funds or insurance companies for example) is 
low in most markets of the Arab region and especially in Saudi Arabia and Qatar due to 
investment restrictions (OECD 2014). Similarly, there is a limited access for foreign investors 
in the GCC region in particular where the opening up to financial flows from overseas has 
remained concentrated in the three dominant financial markets, the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi 
Arabia (Kern 2012). However, in the case of Morocco and Jordan, the massive privatization 
plans and the open access to foreign investors have contributed significantly to the growth 
performance of their stock markets. For the case of Morocco for example, the foreign 
investments to market capitalization represent almost 26.5% in 2012 and 30.37% in 2013 and 
the analysis of the distribution of foreign equity investments by region of origin shows that 
European investors remain the main holders with 80.55% of total foreign investment volume 
in 2013, in second place come the Middle Eastern investors (from the Emirate essentially) 
with 10.47%, North America with 3.98%, Asia with 2.66% and Africa with 2.34% (CDVM 
report 2014).  
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With regard to a number of other salient features, the stock markets in the countries 
studied are still very small compared to other emerging markets (especially in Asia and Latin 
America). In addition, the overall volume of assets managed by institutional investors
9
 and 
wealthy families is very important in the GCC region. The total capitalization of the eight 
Arab bourses has reached $780 billion at the end of 2012 which accounts for 67.7% of the 
MENA countries‟ markets. Table 1 worthy depicts that the Saudi stock market is the largest 
of the eight and also of all Arab stock markets in term of capitalization, accounting for one 
half of the total market capitalization of the stocks studied in 2012 followed by the Qatar 
market with  a capitalization accounting for 16 per cent. Morocco and Jordan experienced a 
decline in stock market capitalization between 2008 and 2012 after its improvement in the 
early 2000s before the current financial crisis. 
 
Table 1. Some characteristics of the stock markets studied 
 Market capitalization (current USD Billion) Market capitalization (% of GDP) Number of Companies Listed 
 2002 2008 2012 2002 2008 2012 2002 2008 2012 
Bahrain 6.8 21.1 16.0 71.16 82.36 52.23 42 45 43 
Kuwait 30.7 107.1 97.0 80.5 72.7 55.78 85 202 189 
Oman 3.9 14.9 20.1 19.84 24.48 25.94 96 122 124 
Qatar - 76.3 126.3 - 66.19 66.4 0 42 42 
Saudi Arabia 74.8 246.3 373.3 39.7 47.39 50.87 68 127 158 
United Arab Emirates 20.3 68.8 67.9 18.55 21.81 18.25 24 96 102 
Jordan 7.0 35.8 26.9 73.97 163.14 87.04 158 262 243 
Morocco 8.5 65.7 52.6 21.25 73.97 54.88 55 77 76 
MENA region 243.7 927.4 1153.3 30.83 43.8 40.65 2717 2460 2163 
Source: World Bank Group;  
Notes: A market capitalization to GDP ratio greater than 100% shows that the market is overvalued, while a value of around 
50% shows undervaluation. 
 
 
3. Empirical strategy  
The methodological framework consists on applying DCC-GARCH and smoothed 
probabilities (SM-DCC-GARCH) on the one hand, and Bayesian quantile regression on the 
other hand. While the DCC-GARCH may allow us to have a full picture regarding the 
financial volatility spillovers across different Arab monarchies (i.e., GCC, Jordan and 
Morocco), the method of smoothed probabilities describes the time series that exhibit breaks 
in their volatile behaviors. The Bayesian method for quantile regression may help us to reach 
better paths, since it enables to assess how interact the different quantiles involved of Stock 
markets of Jordan and Morocco vis-à-vis those of GCC, while avoiding the limits of linear 
quantile regression analysis where optimization and inference are awkward (Benoit and Poel 
2012). Potential control variables were incorporated to see whether they play a powerful role 
in explaining the stock market performance and also the correlation between markets, while 
controlling for possible endogeneity bias. These variables are inflation (INF) and industrial 
production (IP) used as real shock proxies and real interest rate (IR) as indicator of monetary 
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shock10. Real returns are computed as nominal returns less the expected inflation rate, which 
is determined through a one-step-ahead forecast based on the VAR-system considered with a 
constant and four optimal lags. Specifically, the expected inflation rate is estimated from 
an autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model of the actual inflation rate 
while controlling for possible seasonal components. 
The sample consists of six GCC countries (i.e., Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
UAE and Kuwait) and two other Middle East North African countries (i.e., Jordan and 
Morocco). The stock market indices are: BSE for Bahrain, QSE for Qatar, MSM30 for Oman, 
TASI for Saudi Arabia, ADX for UAE, KSE for Kuwait, ASE for Jordan and MASI for 
Morocco. To estimate DCC-GARCH model and smoothed probabilities, we have used daily 
frequency data from 01/01/2008 to 31/12/2014 collected from quandl website. For Bayesian 
quantile regression model, we have regressed separately for Jordan and Morocco their stock 
market returns on GCC stock market returns. As mentioned earlier, some control variables 
that may have “pulling” role for explaining the connection between stock markets were 
included. These variables are unfortunately unavailable in daily frequency and thus we use 
quarterly data in this case spanning between the first quarter of 1990 and the third quarter of 
2014. The data have been collected from Econstats
TM
. 
 
3.1. DCC-GARCH and smoothed probabilities  
 The accurate identification of interdependencies between financial assets is one of the 
most important ingredients in financial applications. Recent years have witnessed a 
remarkable interest in risk management, portfolio hedging and phenomena involving stock 
markets such as spillovers and co-movements. The present research strives to contribute to 
this strand of empirical works that focus on the dependence patterns exhibited by markets. 
Although the volatility spillovers and time-varying correlations are both of utmost 
importance, the existing empirical literature has dealt more considerably with the performance 
of volatility spillover models. The multivariate GARCH models are desirable since they allow 
finding better decision tools in various areas including asset pricing, portfolio selection, etc. 
From 1990, several new techniques were successively developed such as the constant 
conditional correlation (CCC)-GARCH model introduced by Bollerslev et al. (1993), and the 
principal component GARCH model applied by Ding (1994). At the beginning of the 2000s, 
Ding and Engle (2001) and Engle (2002) have presented a time-varying model named the 
dynamic conditional correlation (DCC)-GARCH model that can be considered as CCC-
GARCH model extension. This latter can properly and appropriately determine the 
conditional covariance and correlation between several markets. It may be useful and helpful 
for policymakers, practitioners and asset managers to better understand how the volatility of 
each market yields to the volatilities of other markets. 
In the current research, we employ the dynamic conditional correlation based on Ling 
and McAleer (2003): 
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where Dt is the vector of the conditional volatility terms ; The conditional mean of the return 
vector Rt is specified as a vector autoregressive process of order p with parameter matrices i , 
i=1,2,...,p. The unexplained component t follows a GARCH specification described as 
),0(/ 1 ttt PID where Pt is the time-varying variance-covariance matrix.  
Denoting the conditional variance matrix as Ht, we impose the specification which 
enables to properly depict the volatility spillover in the following model:  
11   ttt BHAwH 
                                                                                               
(2) 
where w is a (2x1) vector of constants, A and B are the matrices (2x2) for the ARCH and 
GARCH effects.  
Based on Engle (2002)‟s study, the conditional correlation can vary over time by 
specifying the variance-covariance matrix  
ttt DP    with  t  specified as the conditional 
correlation matrix.  In order to incorporate regime shifts into the DCC-GARCH model, we 
refer to Billio and Caporin (2005) and Billio et al. (2006) and introduce a Markov -switching 
dynamic correlation model (MS-DCC-GARCH). By doing so, the obtained correlations are 
both time-varying and regime-switching. The main focus of this econometric method is to 
describe the time series that exhibit breaks in their volatile behaviors. This method allows us 
to capture discrete regime shifts that can govern each conditional variance process. In other 
words, within a probabilistic fashion, the parameters of each process may change over time. 
The switching mechanism between the states is Markovian and is assumed to be governed by 
an unobserved (latent) random variable. The underlying processes, though, do not have to be 
Markovian, but are often assumed to be independent from each other. In the simplest case of a 
two-state model, the volatility can be assumed to display either high in regime one (S(1))or 
low in regime two (S(2)). Hence, we have the probability of the transition from one state to 
another. The transition matrix P contains the probabilities pi j of switching from regime i at 
time t to regime j at time t + 1: 
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Concentrating on the dependence structure, the combination between dynamic 
conditional correlation and Markov-switching model seems to provide a useful supplement 
and new insights into a “complex phenomenon” as financial integration. This mixture is a 
succinct representation of the dependencies between underlying variables, allowing us to find 
both volatility spillover and regime-switching dynamic correlation. The dynamic correlation 
is described as a Markov chain, where probability P denotes the probability of state one being 
followed by state two. The estimates of parameters for the two regimes are generated by 
applying Maximum Likelihood technique. The probability is obtained by dividing the 
likelihood of that state by the total likelihood for both states.  
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3.2. A Bayesian quantile regression model 
Although there is a rapidly expanding empirical literature on quantile regression (QR) 
in economics, the studies on Bayesian quantile regression (BQR) seem relatively limited. The 
conventional techniques describe how the mean of y changes with the vector of covariates. 
The error is assumed to have the same distribution whatever values may be taken by the 
components of the vector x. The latter affects only the location of the conditional distribution 
of y, but not its scale. As the mean gives an incomplete picture of a single distribution, the 
regression gives also incomplete picture for a set of distributions. Consequently, Quantile 
regression has emerged as a good supplement to ordinary mean regression, since it is likely to 
provide an accurate description of changes rather than focusing solely on the mean. The upper 
or lower quantiles of the response variable may depend on the covariates very differently 
from the center
11
. However, this technique seems restrictive because it involves minimal 
assumptions (i.e., the error distribution) that may lead to non-normal errors. A satisfactory 
inference procedure is difficult to be tackled, since the asymptotic covariance matrix of 
quantile estimates normally make us an unknown error density function, which cannot be 
estimated reliably. Recent researches have opened the way to a new Bayesian treatment of 
quantile regression, highlighting that BQR performs well in avoiding the restrictive 
parametric assumption. Given this, the current study relies on quantile inference approach via 
Bayesian modeling. The latter possesses considerable advantages compared to the usual 
quantile regression estimates. First, Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method can be 
easily carried out to obtain the posterior distributions even in “complex” situations. Second, it 
performs appropriately when the conditional distribution is not symmetric. Even though the 
QR restriction may be avoided by minimizing the objective function, the BQR must specify 
precise likelihood. The Asymmetric Laplace (ASL) distribution that prompts equivalence 
between posterior mode and simple quantile regression estimates has been carried out to 
construct Bayesian quantile regression model (Yu and Moyeed 2001). Given this, a specific 
distributional assumption for the error terms has been defined (Yue and Rue 2011): 
nixy iii ,...,1,
'                                                                           
(4) 
For the τ th conditional quantile function, 0 < τ < 1, the )(
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where ρτ is a weight calculated by
))0(()(  yIyy  , I (.) is the indicator function and 
0< τ <1.  
Following the ASL distribution, errors are independent and identically distributed, i.e., 
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Then, the error distributions yield ),(x' ASL ~, i
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the responses is expressed as follows: 
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While the asymmetric Laplace distribution enables to properly express quantile 
regression within Bayesian framework, it may lead to more complicated inference based on 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation. To avoid this apparent complexity, the ASL can be 
represented as a scale mixture of normal distributions, as following: 
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Ultimately, Bayesian inference can be effectively applied while imputing the scale 
variables zi as supplementary unknowns (Fahrmeir et al. 2013). Then, the evolution of 
estimator may be sharply observed by setting τ = 0.500 (median regression). The first and the 
last quantiles are obtained by setting τ = 0.100 and τ = 0.900, respectively.  
 
 
4. Main findings 
4.1. MS-DCC-GARCH and smoothed probabilities 
4.1.1. The whole period 
As stated at the outset, we estimate the regime-specific and time-varying correlations 
MS-DCC-GARCH model specified in Equations (1) and (2). Table 2 summarizes the 
parameter estimates of this model for the stock markets of the GCC countries vis-à-vis those 
of Jordan and Morocco (for the whole period, i.e., from 01/01/2008 to 31/12/2014). Our 
results clearly reveal that returns on market portfolios in these countries are sharply 
connected, i.e., their movements affect one another. More precisely, the GCC stock markets 
appear more interdependent with Jordan than Morocco. In fact, judging from the stock market 
coefficients (SMJOR :is related to the Jordan‟s stock market and SMMOR to the Morocco‟s stock 
market), we worthy notice that there is a great interdependence between Jordan and GCC 
(58.6%) compared to that between Morocco and GCC (41.6%). Specifically, there are strong 
interconnections between Jordan and three GCC countries, with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE 
having 93.4%, 91% and 83.8% respectively. This means that the existence of an exact 
interdependence between Jordan and GCC stock markets on one hand, and Morocco and GCC 
in other hand, cannot be ruled out. This can be interpreted as perfect integration between these 
stock markets in the sense that the returns provided by any of them can be totally determined 
by the overall performance in the other markets. The Jordan‟s stock market appears less 
connected to Kuwait (57.5%), Bahrain (49.4%) and Oman (23.8%). For the sake of 
comparison, Morocco is likely to be interdependent with Qatar (86.6%) and Saudi Arabia 
(76.2%) rather than with Kuwait (36.7%), UAE (25.1%), Oman (18.6%) and Bahrain 
(13.3%). In sum, Jordan appears more interdependent to GCC countries than Morocco. It was 
not widely viewed as surprising that the GCC announced a favorable position on Jordan‟s 
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application to join the club, which can be explained by both geopolitical and geographic 
proximity reasons. Nevertheless, the GCC decision to invite Morocco to join the organization 
was profoundly surprising, because the country has only the geopolitical perspective in its 
favor, and hence Morocco‟s membership in the GCC must be followed by several steps to be 
successfully achieved. Further, being more interdependent to Saudi Arabia and Qatar than the 
rest of GCC members seems not surprising, since these countries are recently well positioned 
to respond effectively to the challenges that may stem from the uncertain environment with 
their policy buffers largely eroded, bearing in mind that the Saudi Arabia and Qatar‟s stock 
markets are the largest of Arab stock markets in term of stock market capitalization. Larger is 
the market capitalization, less sizable will be the volatility of stock prices. This implies that 
the stock markets of Saudi Arabia and Qatar may offer more opportunities to foreign investors 
and thus the cooperation with them may be more beneficial for both Jordan and Morocco. 
 Furthermore, the parameters of volatility spillover from GCC to Jordan and from GCC 
to Morocco (Ai or ARCH effects and Bi or GARCH effects) vary remarkably across the Gulf 
countries studied. From the results reported in Table 2, we clearly notice that only A1 and B2 
are statistically significant. By considering these coefficients, we provide significant risk 
transmission from GCC to Jordan and from GCC to Morocco. For Jordan, the volatility 
spillover from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE appears more persistent than from the rest of 
GCC countries, reaching respectively 0.94, 0.98 and 0.88 (Table 2). In the case of Morocco, a 
great volatility spillover was found from Qatar (0.90) and from Saudi Arabia (0.84). Now, 
what we need to remember about the volatility spillovers from GCC to Jordan and GCC to 
Morocco? At all cases reported in Table 2, the volatility spillover from GCC to Jordan is 
stronger than that from GCC to Morocco. We can attribute this outcome to the substantial 
interest of Jordan to join the “Gulf club” running high revenues. While Morocco has never 
shown any particular interest in joining the rich oil Gulf countries, Jordan applied twice, in 
particular in the 1980 and 1996. Besides, the international portfolio diversification is less 
effective across the integrated markets (GCC and Jordan), as investment risk cannot be 
reduced, and portfolio returns can exhibit similar behavior to internal and external shocks. 
Nevertheless and despite the great risk that may occur when Morocco becomes more 
integrated with Arab Gulf countries, the low correlation between the two clearly indicates that 
Morocco can be a good diversification opportunity for investors. 
 
Table 2. Estimates of the MS-DCC-GARCH model  
 GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Saudi Arabia UAE Kuwait 
Jordan vs. GCC countries 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
C 3.021 0.00*** 0.328 0.057* 0.774 0.00*** 3.885 0.00*** -0.543 0.00*** -8.100 0.00*** 2.769 0.00*** 
SMJOR 0.582 0.00*** 0.494 0.00*** 0.910 0.00*** 0.238 0.00*** 0.934 0.00*** 0.838 0.00*** 0.475 0.00*** 
w -1.576 0.00*** -1.230 0.113 -1.435 0.00*** -1.821 0.00*** -1.902 0.00*** -1.326 0.00*** -1.204 0.00*** 
A1 0.386 0.00*** 0.200 0.05*** 0.042 0.00*** 0.037 0.00*** 0.127 0.00*** 0.453 0.00*** 0.048 0.00*** 
A2 -0.260 0.205 0.103 0.842 0.070 0.555 0.118 0.474 0.120 0.192 -0.083 0.490 -0.075 0.599 
B1 0.250 0.186 -0.113 0.790 -0.155 0.152 -0.079 0.619 -0.039 0.709 0.101 0.275 0.100 0.382 
B2 0.451 0.00*** 0.368 0.00*** 0.907 0.00*** 0.405 0.00*** 0.861 0.00*** 0.428 0.032* 0.552 0.00*** 
Morocco vs. GCC countries 
C -7.977 0.00*** 6.478 0.00*** -0.374 0.00*** 5.677 0.00*** 1.500 0.00*** 0.788 0.00*** 4.506 0.00*** 
SMMOR 0.416 0.00*** 0.133 0.00*** 0.866 0.00*** 0.186 0.00*** 0.762 0.00*** 0.251 0.00*** 0.367 0.00*** 
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w -1.324 0.00*** -1.290 0.00*** -1.285 0.00*** -1.445 0.00*** -1.779 0.00*** -3.325 0.00*** -3.942 0.00*** 
A1 0.004 0.00*** 0.090 0.00*** 0.362 0.00*** 0.155 0.00*** 0.438 0.00*** 0.078 0.00*** 0.039 0.00*** 
A2 0.025 0.87 0.075 0.43 -0.018 0.820 0.053 0.559 0.107 0.316 0.005 0.996 0.222 0.029* 
B1 0.015 0.92 -0.105 0.21 -0.009 0.901 -0.019 0.826 -0.096 0.252 0.016 0.882 -0.165 0.00*** 
B2 0.543 0.00*** 0.245 0.00*** 0.549 0.00** 0.436 0.00*** 0.412 0.00*** 0.476 0.00*** 0.410 0.00*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of the MS-DCC-GARCH model given in Equations (1)-(3). The GARCH part of the 
model is specified as a GARCH (1, 1); ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; C: 
Intercept; A1: ARCH effect at state 1 (low volatility regime); A2: ARCH effect at state 2 (high volatility regime); B1: 
GARCH effect at state 1 (low volatility regime); B2: GARCH effect at state 2 (high volatility regime). 
 
To reinforce our findings, a formal volatility spillover tests based on Wald tests 
involving two zero restrictions on the potential  elements of matrices A and B (i.e., associated 
relatively to the ARCH and the GARCH effects) has been applied for the considered 
countries. More accurately, the null hypothesis of no volatility spillover from the GCC stock 
markets to the markets of Jordan and Morocco was tested by imposing the restriction 
A1i=B1i=0 (where i=2). The test outcomes reported in Table 3 reject the no volatility spillover 
hypothesis from GCC to Jordan, from GCC to Morocco, from Qatar to Jordan, from Saudi 
Arabia to Jordan, from UAE to Jordan, from Qatar to Morocco, and then from Saudi Arabia to 
Morocco. Interestingly, these results suggest and confirm the occurrence of powerful 
volatility spillover effect from some GCC stock markets to Jordan and Morocco, sustaining 
the importance of effective cross-border supervision in order to lessen harmful effects of 
volatility transmission across different stock markets. 
 
Table 3. Volatility spillover tests 
Jordan vs. 
GCC 
Jordan vs. 
Bahrain 
Jordan vs. 
Qatar 
Jordan vs. 
Oman 
Jordan vs. Saudi 
Arabia 
Jordan vs. 
UAE 
Jordan vs. 
Kuwait 
H0: No volatility spillover from GCC countries to Jordan 
9.7654*** 
(0.0002) 
0.6986 
(0.1078) 
8.0755** 
(0.0061) 
1.0123 
(0.8782) 
11.2457*** 
(0.0000) 
7.6543** 
(0.0061) 
0.3451 
(0.2567) 
Morocco vs. 
GCC 
Morocco vs. 
Bahrain 
Morocco vs. 
Qatar 
Morocco vs. 
Oman 
Morocco vs. 
Saudi Arabia 
Morocco vs. 
UAE 
Morocco vs. 
Kuwait 
H0: No volatility spillover from GCC countries to Morocco 
10.7651** 
(0.0013) 
0.8802 
(0.3567) 
9.0129*** 
(0.0001) 
0.5643 
(0.2678) 
8.9777*** 
(0.0004) 
0.6134 
(0.7219) 
0.8543 
(0.1510) 
Notes: The table reports the Wald tests for testing the no volatility spillover restrictions imposed on Equation (1). The tests 
report no volatility spillover from GCC countries to Jordan and then to Morocco. The tests are distributed as Chi-square with 
2 degrees of freedom. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Figure 1 plots the smoothed probability estimates of the low volatility regime (state 1) 
and the high volatility regime (state 2). The shaded regions sharply observable correspond to 
the periods where the smoothed probabilities of the regime either lower or higher risk is in its 
maximum. We worthy depict significant features regarding the dependence between GCC 
stock markets and those of Jordan and Morocco. For the correlation between Jordan‟s stock 
market and GCC markets, almost 75% of observations fall into low volatility regime, while 
25% fall into high volatility regime. The Moroccan and GCC markets seem characterized by 
high volatility regime period (85%), with almost 15% falling into low volatility state. Given 
these observations, the interdependence between GCC and Morocco‟s stock market seems 
more risky than the interconnection between Gulf Arab markets and Jordan. It is noted that 
the stock market integration of Jordan to GCC appears natural, while the integration of 
Morocco to GCC seems different. Since unstable GCC markets may generate significant risk 
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exposures in the short-run, it must be done with great care to limit the risks of “forced” 
integration. In the long term, sound policies and good institutions are needed to avoid possible 
painful consequences.  
Remarkably, since the end of 2010, a difference in behavior of the two countries is 
observed. At this period, we note the predominance of low volatility regime in the case of 
Jordan and high volatility period for Morocco (Figure 1)
12
. These results are not surprising 
because since 2011 the political and geostrategic imponderability has led to a shift to more 
uncertain financial markets. The popular political movements across Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries have certainly not overlooked since almost all GCC states have 
confronted some protests. This can explain the sharp switching regime from low volatility 
regime to high volatility period since 2011. We will see in the following whether these results 
are solid, by dividing the study period into pre-crisis (2008-2010) and post-crisis (2011-2014). 
 
Figure 1. Smoothed probability estimates 
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4.1.2. Results by sub-periods  
To reinforce the evidence that the Arab Spring may be perceived as a potential revival 
of financial integration among Gulf Arab countries, Jordan and Morocco, the study period has 
been divided into two sub-periods, i.e., the period spanning between 01/01/2008 and 
31/11/2010 (pre-Arab Spring) and the period from 01/01/2011 to 31/12/2014 (post-Arab 
Spring). The results obtained with MS-DCC-GARCH are reported in Table 4. These 
determine whether there is a sharp change in the relations among capital markets in the 
countries studied and their interdependence over each study periods. These findings may be 
summarized as follows: 
(i) For Jordan, there is a great change in terms of interdependence between its stock 
market and the GCC markets. Specifically, we worthy note that the correlation between 
                                                 
12
 For a more detailed analysis (i.e., inter-country relationship), see Figure A.1 in appendices. 
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Jordan‟s stock market and Gulf Arab stock markets moves from 46% for the period before 
Arab Spring  to 71% in the post-uprisings period. There is an increase by more than half 
(54.34%).  
(ii) For Morocco, a remarkable change is observed when moving from the first sub-period 
to the second one. For instance, the interconnection between Moroccan stock market and 
GCC markets increases intensely from 24% to 55% under the post-uprisings. The correlation 
expands more than doubled (120.83%).  
Despite the role that may play revolts and massive protests in threatening and 
decaying the economy in the whole, it may also play as a “wake-up call” for deepening the 
stock market interdependence between GCC and Jordan and GCC and Morocco
13
. This result 
seems fruitful and promising. This interdependency can enhance the tax and financial systems 
and loosely bring the financial legislations of these countries in the hope of producing a sound 
environment for the conditions of merger across Arab monarchical systems. 
 
Table 4. Sub-periods Estimates of the MS-DCC-GARCH model  
 GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Saudi Arabia UAE Kuwait 
Pre-Arab Spring period 
Jordan vs. GCC countries 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
C 1.441 0.00*** 3.921 0.00*** 0.927 0.00*** 3.142 0.00*** -1.112 0.00*** -3.786 0.00*** 4.225 0.00*** 
SMJOR 0.460 0.00*** 0.206 0.00*** 0.494 0.00*** 0.165 0.00*** 0.521 0.00*** 0.485 0.00*** 0.490 0.00*** 
w -2.400 0.00*** -2.201 0.00*** -2.367 0.00*** -1.381 0.00*** -2.368 0.00*** -1.402 0.00*** -1.393 0.00*** 
A1 1.988 0.00*** 1.691 0.00*** 1.577 0.00*** 1.126 0.00*** 1.511 0.00*** 1.117 0.00*** 1.184 0.00*** 
A2 -0.056 0.861 0.051 0.849 -0.016 0.654 -0.051 0.813 -0.073 0.921 0.097 0.678 0.185 0.608 
B1 0.038 0.886 -0.190 0.400 0.049 0.620 0.075 0.682 0.075 0.722 -0.093 0.675 -0.170 0.603 
B2 0.903 0.00*** 0.866 0.00*** 0.838 0.00*** 0.932 0.00*** 0.808 0.00*** 0.908 0.00*** 0.933 0.00*** 
Morocco vs. GCC countries 
C 2.244 0.00*** 1.410 0.00*** 2.996 0.00*** 4.432 0.00*** 1.594 0.00*** -1.576 0.00*** 3.607 0.00*** 
SMMOR 0.244 0.00*** 0.175 0.00*** 0.285 0.00*** 0.078 0.00*** 0.339 0.00*** 0.156 0.00*** 0.204 0.00*** 
w -1.644 0.00*** -2.101 0.00*** -1.480 0.00*** -1.476 0.00*** -2.199 0.00*** -2.065 0.00*** -1.859 0.00*** 
A1 1.135 0.00*** 1.637 0.00*** 1.112 0.00*** 1.124 0.00*** 1.516 0.00*** 1.726 0.00*** 1.415 0.00*** 
A2 0.050 0.751 -0.068 0.673 0.096 0.414 0.054 0.634 0.049 0.839 -0.112 0.470 -0.085 0.645 
B1 -0.068 0.642 0.060 0.634 -0.127 0.261 0.015 0.869 0.039 0.868 0.121 0.381 0.178 0.261 
B2 0.909 0.00*** 0.913 0.00*** 0.903 0.00*** 0.922 0.00*** 0.798 0.00*** 0.917 0.00*** 0.888 0.00*** 
Post-Arab Spring period 
Jordan vs. GCC countries 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
C 4.355 0.00*** 1.680 0.00*** -0.271 0.00*** 8.413 0.00*** 0.507 0.00*** -3.579 0.00*** 7.654 0.00*** 
SMJOR 0.713 0.00*** 0.268 0.00*** 0.800 0.00*** 0.407 0.00*** 0.865 0.00*** 0.720 0.00*** 0.696 0.00*** 
w -2.428 0.00*** -1.803 0.00*** -2.131 0.00*** -2.028 0.00*** -2.068 0.00*** -3.524 0.00*** -1.332 0.00*** 
A1 1.727 0.00*** 1.531 0.00*** 1.205 0.00*** 1.478 0.00*** 1.185 0.00*** 2.485 0.00*** 1.016 0.00*** 
A2 0.056 0.760 -0.227 0.137 0.015 0.927 0.097 0.576 0.003 0.983 0.033 0.819 0.037 0.820 
B1 -0.054 0.719 0.222 0.053* -0.026 0.871 -0.093 0.540 0.001 0.990 -0.060 0.008** -0.017 0.907 
B2 0.885 0.00*** 0.927 0.00*** 0.882 0.00*** 0.897 0.00*** 0.870 0.00*** 0.550 0.00*** 0.938 0.00*** 
Morocco vs. GCC countries 
C 0.697 0.00*** -0.580 0.00*** 7.747 0.00*** 5.311 0.00*** 5.986 0.00*** 2.622 0.00*** 5.268 0.00*** 
SMMOR 0.553 0.00*** 0.294 0.00*** 0.578 0.00*** 0.267 0.00*** 0.617 0.00*** 0.405 0.00*** 0.368 0.00*** 
w -2.39 0.00*** -1.696 0.00*** -1.423 0.00*** -2.241 0.00*** -1.655 0.00*** -1.316 0.00*** -1.894 0.00*** 
A1 1.690 0.00*** 1.286 0.00*** 1.090 0.00*** 1.550 0.00*** 1.210 0.00*** 1.060 0.00*** 1.329 0.00*** 
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 Country results confirm this observation, i.e., the correlation increases with the inclusion of the Arab Spring 
dummy. They may be obtained upon request. 
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A2 0.081 0.762 0.013 0.960 0.020 0.910 0.052 0.842 -0.064 0.689 -0.065 0.6598 -0.014 0.934 
B1 -0.03 0.880 -0.177 0.468 0.010 0.938 -0.029 0.894 0.109 0.488 0.119 0.4057 0.065 0.662 
B2 0.893 0.00*** 0.899 0.00*** 0.928 0.00*** 0.874 0.00*** 0.909 0.00*** 0.939 0.00*** 0.898 0.00*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of the MS-DCC-GARCH model given in Equations (1)-(3). The GARCH part of the 
model is specified as a GARCH (1, 1); ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; C: 
Intercept; A1: ARCH effect at state 1 (low volatility regime); A2: ARCH effect at state 2 (high volatility regime); B1: 
GARCH effect at state 1 (low volatility regime); B2: GARCH effect at state 2 (high volatility regime). 
 
 
Moreover, by dividing the whole period into two sub-periods, we confirm the above 
obtained evidence that the Arab Spring accentuates the volatility spillovers among Arab stock 
markets considered. More precisely, our results reported in Table 5 reveal that:  
(i) Before the Arab Spring, we accept the no volatility spillover hypothesis for almost all 
the studied cases with the exception of the linkages running from Saudi Arabia to Jordan, 
Qatar to Jordan and Saudi Arabia to Morocco. 
(ii) In post-Arab spring period, we reject the no volatility spillover hypothesis for the 
majority of GCC countries to Jordan and then to Morocco, except the spillovers from Bahrain 
to Morocco and that from Oman to Morocco. This means that the Arab Spring has succeeded 
to revive interconnections among these Arab monarchies.  
 
Table 5. Sub-period volatility spillover tests 
Pre-Arab Spring period 
Jordan vs. 
GCC 
Jordan vs. 
Bahrain 
Jordan vs. 
Qatar 
Jordan vs. 
Oman 
Jordan vs. Saudi 
Arabia 
Jordan vs. 
UAE 
Jordan vs. 
Kuwait 
H0: No volatility spillover from GCC countries to Jordan 
0.7893 
(0.2345) 
0.4387 
(0.2108) 
6.1354*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9312 
(0.7655) 
7.1345** 
(0.0059) 
0.6123 
(0.5517) 
1.1345 
(0.8250) 
Morocco vs. 
GCC 
Morocco vs. 
Bahrain 
Morocco vs. 
Qatar 
Morocco vs. 
Oman 
Morocco vs. 
Saudi Arabia 
Morocco vs. 
UAE 
Morocco vs. 
Kuwait 
H0: No volatility spillover from GCC countries to Morocco 
0.9412 
(0.1000) 
0.5688 
(0.1926) 
0.7144 
(0.1569) 
1.0012 
(0.9516) 
8.1139* 
(0.0122) 
0.6052 
(0.2531) 
0.3894 
(0.2267) 
Post-Arab Spring period 
Jordan vs. 
GCC 
Jordan vs. 
Bahrain 
Jordan vs. 
Qatar 
Jordan vs. 
Oman 
Jordan vs. Saudi 
Arabia 
Jordan vs. 
UAE 
Jordan vs. 
Kuwait 
H0: No volatility spillover from GCC countries to Jordan 
11.7618** 
(0.0023) 
5.9123*** 
(0.0001) 
7.0215** 
(0.0068) 
8.2543** 
(0.0062) 
7.0126*** 
(0.0000) 
10.2356* 
(0.0112) 
8.2514*** 
(0.0000) 
Morocco vs. 
GCC 
Morocco vs. 
Bahrain 
Morocco vs. 
Qatar 
Morocco vs. 
Oman 
Morocco vs. 
Saudi Arabia 
Morocco vs. 
UAE 
Morocco vs. 
Kuwait 
H0: No volatility spillover from GCC countries to Morocco 
7.0913*** 
(0.0001) 
0.8713 
(0.2530) 
6.1857*** 
(0.0000) 
1.1173 
(0.7927) 
8.9210*** 
(0.0006) 
6.9215*** 
(0.0000) 
7.1256** 
(0.0092) 
Notes: The table reports the Wald tests for testing the no volatility spillover restrictions imposed on Equation (1). The tests 
report no volatility spillover from GCC countries to Jordan and then to Morocco. The tests are distributed as Chi-square with 
2 degrees of freedom. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Figure 2 properly depicts the smoothed probabilities of two states under two sub-
periods: low volatility and high volatility regimes in pre- and post-Arab Spring. From a visual 
examination, we show a different behavior regarding the stock market integration of GCC 
countries and Jordan and that of GCC and Morocco when moving from pre-revolution to 
post-revolution. More precisely, under pre-revolution period, the transition probabilities 
results indicate that 35% of observations fall into low volatility regime for Jordan vs. GCC 
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compared to 32% for Morocco vs. GCC, whereas 65% of them fall into high volatility regime 
for the first interdependency and 68% for the second one. So, we can say at this stage that the 
behaviors of the two countries are close. Under post-revolution period, the interconnection 
between Jordan‟s and GCC stock markets is characterized by low volatility regime (58%), 
while the interdependence between Moroccan and GCC markets seems distinguished during 
high volatility regime (90%). By pursuing country-by-country analysis, we notice that this 
result seems unambiguous, i.e., the low volatility remains dominant for Jordan, while state 2 
(i.e., high volatility regime) appears predominant for Morocco. For instance, the linkage 
between Kuwait and Morocco is mainly driven by high volatility process (81%), while the 
dependence between Jordan and UAE seems more influenced by low volatility state (69%) 
(Figure A.3, Appendices). 
The obtained findings clearly reveal a different integration patterns over the post-
uprisings period compared to the previous period. As Jordan is already linked to GCC, it was 
able to effectively mitigate the detrimental impacts of crisis. Intuitively, the shift/ switch 
between the studied states can be mainly associated to the so-called “loss of interdependence” 
(Billio and Caporin 2005). This last phenomenon occurs when the interdependence across the 
markets investigated falls under crisis. Specifically, during a period of turbulence and short-
run disturbance in a market, the other markets may be greatly threatened. However, if they 
succeed to filter the detrimental effects of shock out, the correlation with the turbulent area 
obviously lessens. In that view and according to our results, this phenomenon of “loss of 
interdependence” does not occur in the case of Jordan and Morocco as the interdependence 
has instead increased after the crisis. But the probabilities‟ outcomes show a difference in 
behavior between the two countries (predominantly high volatility for Morocco and low 
volatility for Jordan after Arab spring). Morocco may suffer more than Jordan from the 
volatility spillover running from GCC countries. As Jordan is already linked to GGC, it was 
able to effectively digest the detrimental impacts of crisis by filtering informations and 
especially bad news, by contrast, the inclusion of Morocco in the “GCC club” seems more 
recent and brutal.  
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Figure 2. Sub-period smoothed probability estimates  
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4.2. Bayesian  quantile regression findings 
 
 The use of BQR in gauging the focal link may help us to effectively address whether 
Arab Spring may accelerate the stock market integration of Jordan vis-à-vis GCC and 
Morocco vis-à-vis GCC among different quantile levels. To this end, we regress the stock 
market returns of Jordan and then that of Morocco on GCC stock market returns. The 
regression analysis is applied, using both the traditional (unconditional) test procedure and the 
conditional approach. 
 
4.2.1. Unconditional analysis 
a. Baseline model 
BQR results are reported in Table 6. Sharp differences across the first markets were 
found. We worthy notice that Jordan appears increasingly integrated to GCC stock markets 
among the distinct quantiles involved. Accurately, the stock market dependence between 
Jordan and GCC expands from 0.19 at quantile level 0.100 to 0.32 at level 0.900 (Regressions 
(1) and (2) in Panel 6.1 of Table 6). In addition, at the higher quantiles, the association 
between GCC stock returns and those of Jordan is found to be strong and statistically 
significant. We find that the slope parameters, estimated between the medians and the upper 
quantiles, consistently increase in magnitude confirming the evidence of asymmetry. This 
seems less obvious for Moroccan case. Specifically, the integration of Morocco vis-à-vis 
GCC seems more important at lower quantiles (0.100 and 0.200, in particular) than higher 
quantiles. Koenker and Xiao (2002) test is performed here to examine if the estimated 
quantile regression relationships are conform to the location shift hypothesis, which assumes 
the same slope parameters for all of the conditional quantile functions
14
. The null hypothesis 
of equal slope is rejected at the conventional significance levels, indicating that the slope 
coefficient of the GCC stock market returns differs at all the different parts of the return 
distribution in the case of Jordanian market return. The slope coefficient of the GCC stock 
market returns variable differs at 10th against 90th quantiles, 30th against 70th quantiles and 
40th against 60th quantiles in the case of Moroccan market return (ST(1) and ST(2) in Panel 
6.1 of Table 6). As with the results from above, these findings further indicate that the 
Jordanian and Moroccan stock markets returns‟ response to GCC stock market returns is 
state-dependent and conditional upon where the return is located on the distribution. 
Here, we can already draw the first conclusions from these estimates. First the 
Jordanian stock market returns seems more close to GCC stock market returns that  the 
Moroccan ones. The coefficients in the different quantiles are more important in Jordan than 
in Morocco, although in the latter case all coefficients are significant (but still low). For 
Morocco, unlike Jordan, as more the quantiles increase (i.e., the higher the yield), the more 
the coefficients decrease. This indicates that the Jordan‟s stock market is likely to be more 
connected to GCC markets than the Moroccan market. Not surprisingly, the Gulf investors 
                                                 
14
 The Koenker and Xiao (2002) test computes that all the covariate effects satisfy the null hypothesis of equality 
of the slope coefficients across quantiles. In particular, the difference between slope estimates at the and                   
(1- ) quantiles is examined. A rejection of the null hypothesis would suggest that the magnitude of the slope 
coefficient, estimated at the different parts of the return distribution, is different and that the difference is 
statistically significant. ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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better mastered the Jordanian market given the geographical proximity and the strong 
economic and political relationship between these countries (unlike Morocco). These first 
results confirm those found previously when we analyzed the interdependencies across the 
DCC-GARCH model and transition probabilities. 
 
b. The issue of endogeneity 
Endogeneity problem is often a concern in empirical testing. It may occur for example 
when the dependent variable causes at least one of the covariates (“reverse causation”). To 
deal with this problem, the methods of instrumental variable (IV), generalized method of 
moments (GMM) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) and can be used. In this subsection, we 
re-explore the relationship between real stock returns of GCC and Jordan on the one hand and 
those of GCC and Morocco on the other hand, by using 2SLS method for at least two main 
reasons: First, GMM requires differentiability of the moment functions, while quantile 
regression consists on non-differentiable sample moments. Hence, combining these two 
methods seems inappropriate. Second, for instrumental quantile regression, it turns out very 
difficult to find proper instruments with regard to the focal issue. Indeed, to control for 
endogeneity, we attempt to employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) to the different level of 
quantiles. In particular, in the first stage, we use all the exogenous and the lagged endogenous 
variables to calculate the estimated values of the GCC stock market returns variable. In the 
second stage, the estimated values from the first stage are used in place of the actual values of 
the GCC stock market returns variable. By comparing the BQR (Regressions (1) and (2) of 
Panel 6.1 in Table 6) and the BQR taking into account the endogeneity findings (Regressions 
(3) and (4) of Panel 6.1 in Table 6), we show that the results remain solid for most quantile 
levels involved. The stock market integration Jordan vs. GCC remains stronger (between 0.20 
and 0.32) than Morocco vs. GCC (between 0.019 and 0.11). Koenker and Xiao (2002) test 
shows that the magnitude of the slope coefficient estimated, at the different parts of the return 
distribution, is different and that the difference is statistically significant strengthening our 
findings. Interestingly, we find a continuous increase in the stock market dependence of 
Jordan vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia (between 0.30 and 0.51) across the majority of quantiles levels, 
while a weaker dependence between the stock market return of Saudi Arabia and that of 
Morocco (from 0.07 to 0.18) was found among few quantiles (see Table A.1, Panel A.1.1 in 
Appendices). A deeper link between Qatar and Jordan was also shown among the majority of 
quantiles (between 0.14 and 0.34), whereas the interconnection between Qatar and Morocco 
remains minor (between 0.03 and 0.13 (see Table A.2, Panel A.2.1 in Appendices)
15
. This 
sustains the fact that Jordan, unlike Morocco, has a heavy historical relation with GCC 
countries and particularly Saudi Arabia. . 
 
c. Results by sub-periods  
In the pre-revolution period, the dependence between Jordan and GCC seems to some 
extent substantial at the different quantiles moving from 0.14 to 0.21. Nevertheless, Morocco 
appears much less integrated with GCC under distinct quantiles with correlation fluctuating 
between 0.006 and 0.014 (Regressions (1) and (2) of Panel 6.2 in Table 6). When we take into 
                                                 
15
 A detailed GCC country-by-country analysis is available upon request. 
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account the endogeneity problem, the results are more significant and reinforce our findings 
(Regressions (3) and (4) of Panel 6.2 in Table 6). Concerning the results of Koenker and Xiao 
(2002) test, we found in the baseline model (i.e., BQR) that the slope coefficient of  the GCC 
market return variable differs only at 10th against 90th quantiles for Jordan, and  30th against 
70th quantilles and 40th against 60th quantiles for Morocco (ST(1) and ST(2) respectively, 
Panel 6.2, Table 6). Likewise, the interdependence between Saudi Arabia and Jordan appears 
much more important (fluctuates between 0.26 and 0.33) than that between Saudi Arabia and 
Morocco (does not exceed 0.11, see Table A.1, Panel A.1.2 in Appendices). Likewise, the 
stock market dependence with Qatar appears stronger for Jordan (between 0.11 at lowest 
quantile and 0.21 at highest quantile) than Morocco (between 0.02 and 0.11) at the different 
quantiles involved (see Table A.2, Panel A.2.2 in Appendices).  
It is well shown from Table 6 (Panels 6.2 and 6.3) that there is a substantial change in 
the degree of stock market integration of Jordan vis-à-vis GCC and Morocco vis-à-vis GCC 
when moving from the pre-Arab Spring to the post-Arab Spring. Under pre-revolution period, 
a greater connection increasing sharply from one quantile to another is found for the 
dependence Jordan-GCC, while a weaker relationship between the Morocco‟s stock market 
and GCC is observed at lower quantiles (i.e., this dependence does not exceed 0.09). In the 
post-Arab Spring period, we notice a clearer change in the degree of integration. The 
dependence between Jordan and GCC seems between 0.33 and 0.62, and it expands intensely 
for Morocco vs. GCC, reaching 0.59. This reinforces the greater stock market integration of 
Jordan vs. GCC compared to Morocco vs. GCC under 2011 uprisings. These results remain 
unambiguous among the different methods used (BQR and BQR when controlling for 
endogeneity). This confirms that “Arab Spring” has succeeded to deeply accelerate the 
integration between Morocco and Arab Gulf countries. Differences across distinct quantiles 
depicted via statistic tests of the equality of slope estimates are significant at different levels. 
The previous steps show clearly that our results are robust. The study-by-study investigation 
confirms also the robustness of our results. We find a strong connection between Saudi Arabia 
and Jordan (between 0.45 and 0.55, see Table A.1., Panel A.1.3 in Appendices) and Qatar and 
Jordan (between 0.27 and 0.51, see Table A.2., Panel A.2.3 in Appendices) under post-
revolution. For Morocco, we show that the interdependency increases potentially in the post-
Arab Spring, reinforcing the occurrence of “forced” integration of Saudi Arabia vs. Morocco 
(exceeds 0.50) and Qatar vs. Morocco (almost equals to 0.50) mainly owing the fear of  
massive political instability among Arab countries.  
 
Table 6. Bayesian quantile regression estimates 
 Estimated results of Bayesian quantile regression Statistic tests (ST) of the equality of slope estimates across quantiles 
 Regression(1) Regression (2) Regression(3) Regression(4)  ST (1) ST (2) ST (3) ST (4) 
6.1. Whole period 
0.100 0.19695*** 
(0.0000) 
0.12117*** 
(0.0000) 
0.205848*** 
(0.0000) 
0.110771*** 
(0.0000) 
0.100 vs. 0.900 
 
2.7912* 
(0.0598) 
3.1890* 
(0.0679) 
11.0942*** 
(0.0000) 
8.5613*** 
(0.0000) 
0.200 0.22866*** 
(0.0000) 
0.12422*** 
(0.0000) 
0.332492*** 
(0.0000) 
0.101425*** 
(0.0000) 
0.200 vs. 0.800 
 
0.9810* 
(0.0946) 
0.1306 
(0.3894) 
1.4890* 
(0.0876) 
0.2341 
(0.1580) 
0.300 0.25995*** 
(0.0000) 
0.070574*** 
(0.0000) 
0.300908*** 
(0.0000) 
0.090940*** 
(0.0006) 
0.300 vs. 0.700 
 
1.8910** 
(0.0097) 
3.1245** 
(0.0059) 
9.0435*** 
(0.0000) 
7.8654*** 
(0.0000) 
0.400 0.16790 
(0.1789) 
0.008897*** 
(0.0060) 
0.273062*** 
(0.0000) 
0.019723* 
(0.0267) 
0.400 vs. 0.600 2.3581** 
(0.0034) 
7.6312*** 
(0.0000) 
9.1235*** 
(0.0000) 
6.4981*** 
(0.0000) 
0.500 0.17110 
(0.2315) 
0.009386*** 
(0.3794) 
0.274275*** 
(0.0000) 
0.009899 
(0.2917) 
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0.600 0.17439 
(0.2018) 
0.013256*** 
(0.0000) 
0.267704*** 
(0.0000) 
0.017950 
(0.1785) 
     
0.700 0.18755*** 
(0.0000) 
0.024339*** 
(0.0000) 
0.279751*** 
(0.0000) 
0.018090 
(0.4574) 
     
0.800 0.28451*** 
(0.0000) 
0.015810*** 
(0.0000) 
0.293989*** 
(0.0000) 
0.009258 
(0.5582) 
     
0.900 0.32215*** 
(0.0000) 
0.022516*** 
(0.0000) 
0.329110*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.001445 
(0.9488) 
     
6.2. Pre-Arab Spring period 
0.100 0.198287*** 
(0.0000) 
0.008036*** 
(0.0002) 
0.242603*** 
(0.0000) 
0.098287*** 
(0.0000) 
0.100 vs. 0.900 
 
5.1928*** 
(0.0000) 
0.6851 
(0.1043) 
1.7895** 
(0.0045) 
0.2345 
(0.1000) 
0.200 0.189424*** 
(0.0000) 
0.006484** 
(0.0019) 
0.243320*** 
(0.0000) 
0.089424*** 
(0.0007) 
0.200 vs. 0.800 
 
0.0765 
(0.4672) 
0.7413 
(0.1000) 
3.0543** 
(0.0067) 
4.2890** 
(0.0012) 
0.300 0.144371*** 
(0.0000) 
0.014990** 
(0.0056) 
0.203908*** 
(0.0000) 
0.044371*** 
(0.0031) 
0.300 vs. 0.700 
 
0.1245 
(0.3289) 
1.3455* 
(0.0156) 
0.2564 
(0.1381) 
3.1485** 
(0.0068) 
0.400 0.210415*** 
(0.0000) 
0.009272 
(0.7891) 
0.207302*** 
(0.0000) 
0.010415 
(0.2614) 
0.400 vs. 0.600 0.1567 
(0.2780) 
2.9736** 
(0.0086) 
3.1897** 
(0.0041) 
2.1976* 
(0.0102) 
0.500 0.200647*** 
(0.0000) 
0.009517 
(0.8816) 
0.205988*** 
(0.0000) 
0.000647 
(0.9458) 
  
 
  
0.600 0.213986*** 
(0.0000) 
0.008983 
(0.3621) 
0.201378*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.013986 
(0.1196) 
  
 
  
0.700 0.167969*** 
(0.0000) 
0.014910 
(0.4215) 
0.177521*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.007969 
(0.5931) 
  
 
  
0.800 0.157552*** 
(0.0000) 
0.012398 
(0.6128) 
0.161431*** 
(0.0000) 
0.007552 
(0.5425) 
  
 
  
0.900 0.212774*** 
(0.0000) 
0.015952 
(0.5738) 
0.219029*** 
(0.0000) 
0.012774 
(0.4233) 
  
 
  
6.3. Post-Arab Spring period 
0.100 0.55509*** 
(0.0000) 
0.632483*** 
(0.0000) 
0.547572*** 
(0.0000) 
0.656209*** 
(0.0000) 
0.100 vs. 0.900 
 
1.6795* 
(0.0123) 
6.7321*** 
(0.0000) 
3.5267** 
(0.0069) 
7.8134*** 
(0.0000) 
0.200 0.33619*** 
(0.0000) 
0.525833*** 
(0.0000) 
0.512740*** 
(0.0000) 
0.552059*** 
(0.0000) 
0.200 vs. 0.800 
 
1.9321** 
(0.0089) 
5.1235*** 
(0.0002) 
1.9765* 
(0.0172) 
2.1444** 
(0.0096) 
0.300 0.54698*** 
(0.0000) 
0.500219*** 
(0.0000) 
0.508539*** 
(0.0000) 
0.501718*** 
(0.0000) 
0.300 vs. 0.700 
 
4.2976** 
(0.0013) 
1.9766* 
(0.0124) 
3.8135** 
(0.0010) 
7.0213*** 
(0.0000) 
0.400 0.42544*** 
(0.0000) 
0.452718*** 
(0.0000) 
0.499371*** 
(0.0000) 
0.492359*** 
(0.0000) 
0.400 vs. 0.600 11.1356*** 
(0.0000) 
2.0235* 
(0.0105) 
9.5661*** 
(0.0000) 
4.0256** 
(0.0011) 
0.500 0.44933*** 
(0.0000) 
0.428227*** 
(0.0000) 
0.536250*** 
(0.0000) 
0.479093*** 
(0.0000) 
     
0.600 0.37970*** 
(0.0000) 
0.427261*** 
(0.0000) 
0.556139*** 
(0.0000) 
0.472667*** 
(0.0000) 
     
0.700 0.37528*** 
(0.0000) 
0.427826*** 
(0.0000) 
0.549275*** 
(0.0000) 
0.470425*** 
(0.0000) 
     
0.800 0.42629*** 
(0.0000) 
0.411726*** 
(0.0000) 
0.573713*** 
(0.0000) 
0.460198*** 
(0.0000) 
     
0.900 0.62424*** 
(0.0000) 
0.465447*** 
(0.0000) 
0.636104*** 
(0.0000) 
0.485123*** 
(0.0000) 
     
Notes: Regression (1) Jordan‟s market in function of that of GCC with Baseline model; Regression (2) Morocco‟s market in function 
of that of GCC with Baseline model; Regression (3): Jordan‟s market in function of that of GCC with 2SLS; Regression (4): 
Morocco‟s market in function of GCC with 2SLS; The right columns present the F tests of the equality of slope parameters across 
quantiles. ST(1), ST(2), ST(3) and ST(4) are test statistics of slope parameters across various quantiles for Regression (1), Regression 
(2), Regression (3) and Regression (4) respectively. ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
4.2.2. Conditional analysis 
A simple regression seems unable to properly capture complete picture about the link 
investigated. We fall on the problem of simple regression without potential control variable, 
which may distort the estimate. Indeed, we shall explain in the following whether the results 
change when incorporating some relevant control variables that can influence stock market 
returns and considering a dummy variable which corresponds to the onset of Arab Spring 
event (DV)
16
. The results are reported in Table 7. 
                                                 
16
 We use here a dummy variable that equals to 1 from 2011q1 and 0 otherwise, since the data of inflation, 
industrial production and real interest rate are available only in quarterly frequency, and thus the post-uprisings 
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a. Baseline model  
Despite the change in magnitude of interdependence (i.e., a slight increase in GCC 
stock market coefficient among the different quantile levels for Jordan (Regression (1), Panel 
7.1, Table 7) and a more clearer increase for Jordan vs. GCC across lower quantiles 
(Regression (2), Panel 7.1, Table 7), the fact that Jordan appears more interdependent to GCC 
than Morocco remains solid. Koenker and Xiao (2002) test confirms our previous findings, 
i.e., the null hypothesis is rejected
17
. Remarkably, the control variables affect significantly 
Jordan‟s and Morocco‟s stock markets for most of quantiles, with the exception of real 
interest rate. Its effect appears minor and significant at few quantiles. At higher quantiles, the 
relationship between interest rate and stock market returns still insignificant for both Jordan 
and Morocco. Real interest has a slight influence on Morocco‟s market, highlighting that 
interest rate cannot act as effective monetary instrument, because this needs a flexible money 
market coupled with well developed financial system, efficient banking sector and sufficiently 
good quality of institutions. Additionally, our results reveal that stock returns serve as a 
“partial” hedge against inflation pressures for the two countries. In other words, equity stocks 
compensate investors for accelerating of inflation rate through corresponding accelerating in 
nominal stock returns, thereby leaving real returns unaffected (see Lee (1992) and Bouoiyour 
et al. (2015)). As expected, we note that growth in industrial production affects positively and 
significantly the stock markets of Jordan and Morocco.  
When accounting for the Arab Spring events, we worthy observe that the dependence 
between Morocco and GCC markets change considerably (Regressions (1) and (2), Panel 7.2, 
Table 7). We note an expectedly weak change in the stock market independence of Jordan 
vis-à-vis GCC (i.e., without DV, the coefficients vary between 0.1 and 0.54 and fluctuate 
between 0.30 and 0.56 when including the Arab Spring dummy variable). In addition, a 
remarkable increase in the degree of interdependency is noted for Morocco vs. GCC. 
Precisely, the coefficient of the variable SMGCC moves sharply from 0.004-0.13 (without DV) 
to 0.13-0.39 (with DV). The results remain robust when dividing the whole period into pre-
and post-uprisings (see Table A.1 in Appendices) and when accounting for relevant control 
variables that may determine the focal linkage. It should be noted that, as in the case of MS-
DCC-GARCH model, the impact of the change that occurs following 2011 uprisings, is 
greater in the case of Morocco than in the case of Jordan.   
 
b. The issue of endogeneity 
By controlling for endogeneity, the results change weakly in magnitude, but they 
remain unambiguous
18
. Accurately, the dependence between Jordan and GCC appears much 
greater than the dependence between Morocco and GCC (Regressions (3) and (4), Panel 7.1, 
Table 7). As a result, we can conclude that the interconnection between GCC and the two 
MENA countries considered is conditioning upon potential control variables. For Jordan, 
GCC stock returns estimates are insignificant at extreme quantiles (0.100 and 0.900) and 
                                                                                                                                                        
data set (2011q1-2014q4) seems very small. To ensure the robustness of our results, we add in appendices (Table 
A.1), the detailed outcomes under pre-revolution (1990q1-2010q3) and post-revolution period (2011q1-2014q3). 
17
 The Table reports only the BQR of stock returns. Detailed results available for other control variables can be 
obtained upon request. 
18
 All variables are endogenous here. We apply the same principle used in the unconditional model, ie the 2SLS 
method is used, following the two steps for each variable. 
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become significant in intermediate quantiles. For Morocco, while GCC stock return estimates 
are significant at lower quantile (0.100, 0.200 and 0.300), they become insignificant at the 
higher quantile. The F test shows that the differences across various quantiles are significant 
at the 1% level in the case of Jordan, while in the case of Morocco, the null hypothesis of 
equality of the slope parameter at 10th against 90th quantiles is not rejected. The relationship 
between the control variables and the stock market returns varies among quantiles with the 
expected signs.   
By carrying out BQR, controlling for the endogeneity problem (2SLS) and 
incorporating additional fundamentals (Regressions (3) and (4), Panel 7.2, Table 7), we find a 
weaker decrease in the magnitude of GCC stock market coefficient for Jordan. However, a 
sharp increase in the dependence between GCC and Moroccan stock market was shown. More 
fundamentally, the consideration of the endogeneity problem and the Arab Spring does not 
change our main conclusions. There are no major changes regarding the control variables. It is 
the same for Koenker and Xiao (2002)‟s tests (all F-tests are significant)19.  
In sum, it is well observed that Jordan seems more integrated to GCC stock market 
than Morocco. This integration has accelerated in the Jordan case, like Morocco. However, it 
is interesting to note that, as in MS-DCC-GARCH analysis, Morocco‟s convergence rate is 
higher than that of Jordan. It must be said that Morocco starts by far; it is, indeed, the country 
whose entire economy is the lowest among the Arab monarchies studied, including Jordan. 
 
 
Table 7. Conditional analysis within Bayesian quantile regression 
  Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression  (4) 
  Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
7.1. Without DV 
Intercept 0.100 1.273071 0.2234 0.136506 0.0000*** 2.153407 0.2680 0.396477 0.0057** 
 0.200 1.285084 0.1986 0.106727 0.0000*** 1.376312 0.2818 0.352025 0.0019** 
 0.300 1.304185 0.2522 0.122853 0.0002*** 1.949860 0.1953 0.280627 0.0271* 
 0.400 1.338784 0.3145 0.150405 0.0019** 1.904510 0.6223 0.382366 0.0145* 
 0.500 1.478137 0.1467 0.144549 0.0000*** 2.173627 0.2867 0.377912 0.0121* 
 0.600 1.349685 0.0766* 0.144999 0.0000*** 1.970823 0.0829* 0.408388 0.0072** 
 0.700 1.386262 0.0145* 0.190667 0.0000*** 1.629117 0.0509* 0.293073 0.1313 
 0.800 1.549648 0.1257 0.256329 0.0000*** 1.666358 0.2404 0.154606 0.5494 
 0.900 01636106 0.1832 0.229987 0.0000*** 1.551312 0.0043** -0.016153 0.9443 
SMGCC 0.100 0.105504 0.0001*** 0.004534 0.0000*** 0.111730 0.1317 0.049521 0.0000*** 
 0.200 0.181807 0.0000*** 0.150706 0.0000*** 0.256626 0.0000*** 0.256972 0.0161* 
 0.300 0.209522 0.0000*** 0.148620 0.0001*** 0.282924 0.0000*** 0.210890 0.0963* 
 0.400 0.215186 0.0000*** 0.136061 0.0008*** 0.284350 0.0005*** 0.282476 0.2377 
 0.500 0.412330 0.0013** 0.435351 0.2819 0.322179 0.0000*** 0.422994 0.1790 
 0.600 0.425759 0.0027** 0.552186 0.2241 0.368428 0.0000*** 0.515344 0.3469 
 0.700 0.510539 0.0000*** 0.504670 0.1890 0.403262 0.0000*** 0.298066 0.5577 
 0.800 0.538540 0.0000*** 0.799137 0.1456 0.407718 0.0174* 0.310919 0.6991 
 0.900 0.542259 0.0005*** 0.640114 0.1824 0.529639 0.7176 0.421582 0.4188 
INF 0.100 0.049671 0.0303* 0.154400 0.0876* 0.050906 0.1368 -0.039892 0.7973 
 0.200 0.041771 0.0424* 0.111337 0.0095** 0.033663 0.3655 0.100035 0.3737 
                                                 
19
 Country results point in the same direction (see Appendices).  Figure A.4 (Appendices) depicts how behave 
the connection between the stock markets of GCC, Jordan and Morocco under different quantiles. It indicates 
also to what extent a sudden event as “Arab Spring” may change the linkages between countries. The change in 
dependence appears greater in Morocco than Jordan, especially when comparing the process estimates during 
pre-Arab spring with those of post-Arab spring.. 
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 0.300 0.048701 0.1000 0.113794 0.1564 0.055268 0.0584* 0.095885 0.4039 
 0.400 0.093885 0.0096** 0.179452 0.3279 0.058883 0.0546* 0.208871 0.2506 
 0.500 0.118451 0.0043** 0.175415 0.0909 0.062190 0.0791* 0.269305 0.1317 
 0.600 0.095026 0.1865 0.152250 0.0088 0.036642 0.3375 0.250002 0.1076 
 0.700 0.081806 0.2654 0.584061 0.0315* 0.010194 0.7672 0.132569 0.0267* 
 0.800 0.088804 0.3752 0.130320 0.0296* 0.012949 0.6790 0.191813 0.0301* 
 0.900 0.067437 0.2654 0.439136 0.0150* 0.031067 0.6010 0.323727 0.0039** 
IP 0.100 0.07250 0.1245 0.004850 0.0000*** 0.066096 0.0963* 0.016232 0.0017** 
 0.200 0.06917 0.0008*** 0.004212 0.0008*** 0.053168 0.0863* 0.012494 0.0048** 
 0.300 0.08447 0.0000*** 0.005145 0.0056** 0.056522 0.0699* 0.010274 0.0519* 
 0.400 0.010324 0.1567 0.012047 0.0511* 0.050771 0.1034 0.017188 0.1605 
 0.500 0.017923 0.1838 0.011403 0.0000*** 0.050362 0.1365 0.019497 0.0942* 
 0.600 0.037653 0.0000*** 0.010018 0.0000*** 0.055279 0.1232 0.018946 0.0650* 
 0.700 0.048932 0.0000*** 0.009237 0.0000*** 0.063756 0.0231* 0.010137 0.2783 
 0.800 0.011986 0.1915 0.008465 0.2544 0.054039 0.0389* 0.007933 0.3537 
 0.900 0.013226 0.2011 0.007853 0.1893 -0.006873 0.6109 0.008205 0.3017 
IR 0.100 0.000194 0.1896 0.003806 0.0656* -0.020338 0.1141 -0.006801 0.0807* 
 0.200 0.000597 0.2235 0.003427 0.0091** 0.001262 0.9980 -0.006170 0.0785* 
 0.300 0.006607 0.5672 -0.004264 0.1892 0.017175 0.3394 -0.004866 0.2599 
 0.400 -0.011030 0.0002*** -0.014658 0.4435 -0.000341 0.0000*** -0.012705 0.3907 
 0.500 -0.021076 0.0134* -0.014261 0.3681 -0.028389 0.0000*** -0.014864 0.3028 
 0.600 0.006769 0.1000 -0.012825 0.0091** 0.002526 0.9187 -0.016080 0.2164 
 0.700 0.009241 0.1352 -0.012406 0.5122 0.010195 0.6001 -0.009055 0.4693 
 0.800 0.015788 0.8650 -0.012920 0.6379 0.009803 0.5398 -0.009205 0.4799 
 0.900 0.014892 0.8813 -0.009512 0.4583 0.007101 0.5016 -0.012384 0.1996 
Statistic tests of the equality of slope estimates across various quantiles 
 0.100 vs. 0.900 6.9821 0.0000*** 0.0567 0.1922 5.1479 0.0000*** 7.9654 0.0000*** 
 0.200 vs. 0.800 7.0035 0.0000*** 0.0689 0.3571 6.3799 0.0000*** 0.1345 0.3456 
 0.300 vs. 0.700 5.9817 0.0000*** 0.1151 0.4211 7.1245 0.0000*** 0.2245 0.2235 
 0.400 vs. 0.600 6.2988 0.0000*** 0.0314 0.1000 8.0563 0.0000*** 0.1670 0.1876 
 
 
 
(Continued)                                                        7.2. With DV 
Intercept 0.100 0.728070 0.3256 0.733260 0.0008*** 0.927867 0.4384 1.051995 0.0795* 
 0.200 0.901986 0.0134* 0.648305 0.0356* 1.013378 0.2299 1.080745 0.1427 
 0.300 0.434964 0.0256* 0.492643 0.0783* 1.541022 0.0176* 1.174808 0.1942 
 0.400 0.403736 0.0100* 0.684511 0.0188* 1.441415 0.0140* 1.311808 0.0126* 
 0.500 0.592118 0.0086** 0.379183 0.0615* 1.901563 0.0001*** 1.127259 0.0420* 
 0.600 0.379209 0.0000*** 0.386133 0.0808* 1.753809 0.0002*** 1.085686 0.0641* 
 0.700 0.354553 0.0000*** 0.352967 0.0913* 1.764966 0.0002*** 0.790914 0.1598 
 0.800 0.314343 0.0000*** 0.315844 0.2678 1.678655 0.0001*** 0.614508 0.3951 
 0.900 0.978136 0.0000*** 1.057619 0.0064** 1.328126 0.0015** 0.473615 0.4867 
SMGCC 0.100 0.307690 0.0345* 0.313088 0.3914 0.318186 0.0008*** 0.432647 0.1450 
 0.200 0.373041 0.0096 0.263621 0.5063 0.342472 0.0411* 0.408994 0.1816 
 0.300 0.387046 0.0197* 0.214287 0.0912* 0.348186 0.0171* 0.380395 0.2819 
 0.400 0.371530 0.0095** 0.280484 0.0372* 0.379619 0.0423* 0.336277 0.0539* 
 0.500 0.446871 0.0632* 0.185569 0.0169* 0.409339 0.0730* 0.441283 0.0153* 
 0.600 0.446846 0.0003*** 0.156180 0.0184* 0.406621 0.0047** 0.494176 0.0123* 
 0.700 0.458232 0.0015** 0.137498 0.0039** 0.425683 0.0042** 0.599701 0.0055** 
 0.800 0.564629 0.0222* 0.134422 0.0000*** 0.493487 0.0139* 0.676681 0.0078** 
 0.900 0.564731 0.0157* 0.390798 0.0000*** 0.515703 0.0215* 0.729195 0.0031** 
INF 0.100 0.030676 0.0056** 0.111730 0.0436* 0.033424 0.0260* 0.262206 0.4436 
 0.200 0.030926 0.0414* 0.379784 0.0456* 0.031842 0.0305* 0.277354 0.2007 
 0.300 0.030795 0.0009*** 0.150864 0.0013** 0.023530 0.0087** 0.287100 0.0136* 
 0.400 0.031824 0.0076** 0.191171 0.0203* 0.020106 0.1869 0.278184 0.0192* 
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 0.500 0.032947 0.3572 0.112774 0.0327* 0.019367 0.2611 0.260654 0.0445* 
 0.600 0.030951 0.3888 0.166006 0.2568 0.016033 0.3420 0.242972 0.1290 
 0.700 0.033901 0.2504 0.242624 0.0094** 0.016743 0.2890 0.247641 0.0815* 
 0.800 0.030777 0.3269 0.233380 0.0876* 0.011684 0.3996 0.207539 0.5995 
 0.900 0.031045 0.1595 0.229639 0.1795 0.015227 0.1888 0.203473 0.7838 
IP 0.100 0.100442 0.0016** 0.004441 0.0000*** 0.105241 0.0724* 0.003994 0.0004*** 
 0.200 0.033542 0.0904* 0.004449 0.0000*** 0.037507 0.2642 0.003822 0.0007*** 
 0.300 0.033523 0.1266 0.003510 0.0000*** 0.051673 0.1109 0.003161 0.0055** 
 0.400 0.034545 0.1597 0.003558 0.0000* 0.044625 0.1468 0.002650 0.0135* 
 0.500 0.032586 0.0813* 0.003595 0.0015** 0.041399 0.0975* 0.002199 0.0396* 
 0.600 0.029611 0.0267* 0.003615 0.0322* 0.058076 0.0475* 0.001796 0.0696* 
 0.700 0.030558 0.0091** 0.003555 0.0541* 0.053041 0.0534* 0.001716 0.0537* 
 0.800 0.030474 0.0313* 0.003476 0.0954* 0.064859 0.0121* 0.000792 0.3056 
 0.900 0.031592 0.0454* 0.003605 0.0008*** 0.024005 0.0900* 0.000307 0.6594 
IR 0.100 -0.037321 0.0033** 0.007514 0.2741 -0.063552 0.0000*** 0.007028 0.9826 
 0.200 -0.038017 0.0007*** -0.013680 0.0000*** -0.016449 0.0000*** -0.012465 0.0038** 
 0.300 0.027448 0.9768 -0.029757 0.0008*** 0.015317 0.6228 -0.045772 0.0258* 
 0.400 0.027911 0.3912 -0.004994 0.3876 0.032553 0.2874 -0.003670 0.8916 
 0.500 0.034761 0.4569 0.007390 0.4512 0.045277 0.1745 0.006456 0.7873 
 0.600 0.034305 0.4187 0.004667 0.2670 0.045687 0.2118 0.008083 0.7176 
 0.700 0.023663 0.4456 0.003564 0.5988 0.024534 0.4758 0.002593 0.8986 
 0.800 0.020606 0.5239 0.000593 0.8803 0.015019 0.6276 -0.000971 0.9397 
 0.900 0.047196 0.5543 -0.001172 0.4561 0.009793 0.7384 -0.001038 0.9254 
DV 0.100 0.003812 0.8542 -0.002812 0.0000*** 0.002173 0.9723 -0.002181 0.0000*** 
 0.200 -0.036952 0.2769 -0.000942 0.0000*** -0.034783 0.3904 -0.002064 0.0002*** 
 0.300 -0.028705 0.0189* -0.008987 0.0000*** -0.057206 0.0724* -0.001686 0.0055** 
 0.400 -0.030103 0.0328* -0.003645 0.0000* -0.054968 0.0715* -0.001454 0.0287* 
 0.500 -0.034889 0.0079** -0.002330 0.0000*** -0.072681 0.0086 -0.001251 0.0568* 
 0.600 -0.037933 0.1876 -0.003194 0.0093** -0.047173 0.1132 -0.001130 0.0616* 
 0.700 -0.034296 0.1505 -0.004158 0.0179* -0.039719 0.1352 -0.001072 0.0488* 
 0.800 -0.031160 0.2284 -0.001219 0.1570 -0.030534 0.1928 -0.000762 0.1322 
 0.900 -0.059122 0.1977 -0.001000 0.0909* -0.029248 0.1562 -0.000415 0.3553 
Statistic tests of the equality of slope estimates across various quantiles 
 0.100 vs. 0.900 8.9765 0.0000*** 9.0453 0.0000*** 8.12594 0.0000*** 8.1926 0.0000*** 
 0.200 vs. 0.800 9.1345 0.0000*** 12.3861 0.0000*** 7.66438 0.0000*** 3.7615 0.0013** 
 0.300 vs. 0.700 7.8965 0.0000*** 10.6608 0.0000*** 9.02851 0.0000*** 5.0308 0.0007*** 
 0.400 vs. 0.600 11.1248 0.0000*** 10.0000 0.0000*** 7.84505 0.0000*** 1.1205 0.0456* 
Notes: (1) Jordan‟s stock market in function of that of GCC with Baseline model; (2) Morocco‟s market in function of that of 
GCC with Baseline model; (3) Jordan‟s market in function of that of GCC with 2SLS; (4) Morocco‟s market in function of 
that of GCC with 2SLS; The right columns present the F tests of the equality of slope parameters across various quantiles. A 
rejection of the null hypothesis normally means that the magnitude of the slope coefficient appears different among the 
distinct parts of the return distribution; ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
5. Conclusions and some implications 
In this world with progressively increasing capital flows, the diversification benefits 
from exposure to emerging financial markets have particularly attracted enormous attention 
among individual and institutional investors. At the same time, emerging markets were 
growing at a fast pace with a strong endeavour to financially integrate regionally and globally.  
This is the case of the Gulf countries which the recent Arab uprisings have enforced them to 
an economic and social upgrading in order to respond to the new political risks, and to 
contribute to the regional financial governance. The Arab world has experienced a sudden, 
exceptional and youthful revolutionary dynamic since the end of 2010. The hope of change, 
long repressed, was liberated from the heavy fear ending different republican regimes and 
knocking the Arab monarchies doors. The massive protests among MENA countries 
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demanding political reforms, freedom, and democracy and dismantling corruption have led 
the GCC members to reshape themselves as a “club” for further monarchical systems by 
including the two remaining Arab monarchies (i.e., Jordan and Morocco) into the grouping.  
The motivation of the present research is to effectively analyse whether the degree of 
interdependence among the Arab monarchies changes with the onset of the “Arab Spring”. 
More accurately, our work discusses the effects of the Arab revolution in term of increasing 
the correlation between the financial markets of Arab monarchies (i.e., GCC members, Jordan 
and Morocco) and thus increasing the opportunities for the Gulf States to enlarge and 
diversify their engagement in the MENA region. For this purpose, we apply a Dynamic 
Conditional Correlation model (DCC-GARCH) within Markov Switching Regime (MS) 
framework and a Bayesian quantile regression while controlling for endogeneity and 
incorporating potential control variables. By doing so, the saying that “every cloud has a 
silver lining” was verified, and the research questions were appropriately answered. An 
affirmative response can be given to all questions: Our results put in evidence that the stock 
markets of the Arab monarchies club may be served as a diversification opportunity for 
investors, especially in the case of Moroccan stock market. From the perspective of 
international investors, this latter offers higher potential gains from international portfolio 
diversification, whereas a relatively little potential gains can be expected for the Jordanian 
stock market. The thrust of this paper is that the 2011 Arab spring has played a powerful role 
in deepening the interdependence across the focal stock markets. We worthy note a different 
dependence patterns since 2011, implying that the Arab Spring revives financial integration 
across Arab monarchies. This increase in the interconnection among them will obviously 
facilitate access to further aid and private capital flows, to create new financing options, to 
increase cross-border asset trade and to increase essentially the correlation between markets. 
Strong and liquid capital markets will offer cheaper borrowing costs for firms who hope to 
raise their funds. This result appears robust among all the econometric methods used (i.e., 
DCC-GARCH within Markov Switching Regime (MS) and BQR). However, in the case of 
Morocco, despite the short-term benefits, its association with the Gulf monarchies seems 
risky, given its strong links with Europe and his attempts to set up constitutional reforms, 
which are far concerns of Gulf countries. Accurately, the analysis of transition probabilities 
shows that the integration between its stock market and the GCC markets is carried out in 
turbulent rather than tranquil periods. This implies that there is a potential risk for this 
country. Expectedly, the GCC will encourage Morocco (and Jordan) to face up protesters‟ call 
for more democracy, human rights, equality between men and women, etc. In fact, Morocco 
(and to a lesser extent Jordan) has a difficult choice that must be made between its integration 
with the Gulf countries or with the United States and Western Europe. The first seems easier 
and less restrictive (at last at the short-run). The second appears more complicated since aid 
from Western countries (although it remains low compared to that coming from Gulf 
countries) have some restrictive counterparties, i.e., substantial institutional changes including 
more democracy, human rights, an increasing equality between men and women, etc. This is 
especially true in regard to the actual situation of Europe (the unprecedented economic crisis 
and increasing shortages of resources). But Jordan, unlike Morocco, borders Saudi Arabia, 
greatly dependent on external aid and seeks closer links with the Gulf countries. Nevertheless, 
the recent invitation to Jordan and Morocco to become full members of the GCC may be also 
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a sign of the GCC‟s influence and ability during critical and decisive stage. Besides, the Arab 
Gulf cooperation by embracing Morocco and Jordan has embarked them on a very risky road. 
Unquestionably, the current Arab democratic spirit has affected political structures in all Arab 
states, regardless of their rulers‟ positions. However, the newly movement of democratic 
activism across the Arab world will no doubt still vigilant in criticizing the policies pursued 
by the Arab monarchies, threatening the political environment and accentuating the regional 
tensions rather than economic and financial benefits. To avoid pitfalls, the success of the 
strategic regional realignment depends considerably on a demographic transition coupled with 
an acceleration of education investment, a fulfillment of human rights and a progress of social 
security system. An effective achievement of integration among these countries requires a 
political/regulatory commitment, preconceived planning for cultural measures and close 
monitoring. Harmonizing investment laws and implementing a transparent macro-prudential 
policy and a warning system toolkit maybe also important to enhance the development 
prospects of financial markets among these countries in the coming years (Takagi 2012). The 
development of these strategies may require large time to be fully achieved, as the 
understanding of these measures remains -up to now- evolving. 
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Appendices 
Figure A.1. Smoothed probability estimates (the whole period) 
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Jordan vs. Saudi Arabia Morocco vs. Saudi Arabia 
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Figure A.2. Smoothed probability estimates (Pre-Arab Spring) 
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Jordan vs. Saudi Arabia Morocco vs. Saudi Arabia 
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Figure A.3. Smoothed probability estimates (Post-Arab Spring) 
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Jordan vs. Saudi Arabia Morocco vs. Saudi Arabia 
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Table A.1. 2SLS
20
 Bayesian quantile regression estimates (Saudi Arabia vs. Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia vs. Morocco) 
 Estimated results of Bayesian quantile regression Statistic tests of the equality of slope estimates across various quantiles 
 Qatar vs. Jordan Qatar vs. Morocco  Qatar vs. Jordan Qatar vs. Morocco 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
A.2.1. Whole period 
0.100 0.306482 0.4872 0.073589 0.0000*** 0.100 vs. 0.900 10.3567 0.0000*** 4.3561 0.0011** 
0.200 0.310184 0.9704 0.109461 0.0006*** 0.200 vs. 0.800 9.2172 0.0000*** 3.1566 0.0367* 
0.300 0.324680 0.3391 0.118654 0.0055** 0.300 vs. 0.700 9.6544 0.0000*** 8.0145 0.0000*** 
0.400 0.379452 0.0552* 0.072238 0.1664 0.400 vs. 0.600 5.9808 0.0000*** 0.3035 0.6978 
0.500 0.381467 0.0673* 0.134279 0.3070      
0.600 0.466582 0.0225* 0.186572 0.5659      
0.700 0.487590 0.0700* 0.097695 0.9501      
0.800 0.407731 0.2093 0.092739 0.9114      
0.900 0.510293 0.9413 0.129177 0.0954*      
A.2.2. Pre-Arab Spring period 
0.100 0.263105 0.0004*** 0.036920 0.8437 0.100 vs. 0.900 7.1322 0.0000*** 0.5132 0.6542 
0.200 0.311545 0.0117* 0.036159 0.8561 0.200 vs. 0.800 3.8542 0.0043** 0.9766 0.2341 
0.300 0.316419 0.0370* 0.036741 0.5741 0.300 vs. 0.700 5.1007 0.0008*** 3.5782 0.0067** 
0.400 0.320636 0.0351* 0.047949 0.0375* 0.400 vs. 0.600 4.8719 0.0012*** 2.9213 0.0145* 
0.500 0.327835 0.0696* 0.048722 0.0290*      
0.600 0.329768 0.4216 0.049213 0.0771*      
0.700 0.325740 0.8786 0.051821 0.0231*      
0.800 0.333493 0.9334 0.111388 0.0611*      
0.900 0.336311 0.0770* 0.118512 0.0094**      
A.2.3. Post-Arab Spring period 
0.100 0.477409 0.3241 0.195155 0.0000*** 0.100 vs. 0.900 8.1556 0.0000*** 9.0874 0.0000*** 
0.200 0.496190 0.0001*** 0.250548 0.0000*** 0.200 vs. 0.800 6.9721 0.0000*** 5.8088 0.0000*** 
0.300 0.531585 0.0012** 0.348621 0.0005*** 0.300 vs. 0.700 6.3370 0.0000*** 7.1023 0.0000*** 
0.400 0.536142 0.0126* 0.344930 0.0001*** 0.400 vs. 0.600 7.2596 0.0000*** 6.4011 0.0000*** 
0.500 0.549397 0.0043** 0.419890 0.0000***      
0.600 0.552812 0.0084** 0.506343 0.0000***      
0.700 0.553856 0.0110* 0.483730 0.0615*      
0.800 0.554495 0.0060** 0.506746 0.0157*      
0.900 0.557680 0.0271* 0.513573 0.0083**      
Notes: The right columns present the F tests of the equality of slope parameters across various quantiles. A rejection of the 
null hypothesis normally means that the magnitude of the slope coefficient appears different among the distinct parts of the 
return distribution; ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 The results of Baseline model are consistent with 2SLS, and are available upon request. 
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Table A.2. 2SLS Unconditional Bayesian quantile regression estimates (Qatar vs. Jordan 
and Qatar vs. Morocco 
 Estimated results of Bayesian quantile regression Statistic tests of the equality of slope estimates across various quantiles 
 Qatar vs. Jordan Qatar vs. Morocco  Qatar vs. Jordan Qatar vs. Morocco 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
A.3.1. Whole period 
0.100 0.145760 0.0301* 0.095785 0.0414* 0.100 vs. 0.900 9.7654 0.0000*** 1.1325 0.2219 
0.200 0.182727 0.0350* 0.070092 0.0437* 0.200 vs. 0.800 8.6543 0.0000*** 5.8431 0.0000*** 
0.300 0.245540 0.2833 0.105530 0.0026** 0.300 vs. 0.700 5.8812 0.0000*** 0.2765 0.5534 
0.400 0.241025 0.0737* 0.017962 0.9538 0.400 vs. 0.600 0.1456 0.4567 3.1867 0.0506* 
0.500 0.244026 0.0534* 0.022177 0.8235      
0.600 0.257123 0.0653* 0.134065 0.8097      
0.700 0.282699 0.0019** 0.101976 0.6002      
0.800 0.304543 0.0015** 0.061017 0.6898      
0.900 0.345769 0.7370 0.050112 0.8209      
A.3.2. Pre-Arab Spring period 
0.100 0.115522 0.2438 0.098224 0.2341 0.100 vs. 0.900 5.0321 0.0004*** 0.1356 0.6754 
0.200 0.143867 0.8554 0.058405 0.2350 0.200 vs. 0.800 1.1421 0.0213* 0.5617 0.4388 
0.300 0.166979 0.2235 0.086103 0.2833 0.300 vs. 0.700 0.8120 0.1567 0.2245 0.5089 
0.400 0.162767 0.9958 0.028253 0.1737 0.400 vs. 0.600 7.2351 0.0000*** 3.1567 0.0156* 
0.500 0.164074 0.5759 0.034120 0.1534      
0.600 0.197470 0.4916 0.046234 0.1653      
0.700 0.200259 0.0000*** 0.084688 0.0019**      
0.800 0.209597 0.0000*** 0.021746 0.0015**      
0.900 0.213468 0.0000*** 0.105766 0.0370*      
A.3.3. Post-Arab Spring period 
0.100 0.279472 0.1390 0.242603 0.7211 0.100 vs. 0.900 9.5641 0.0000*** 5.8011 0.0000*** 
0.200 0.303965 0.0309* 0.114795 0.5675 0.200 vs. 0.800 6.3842 0.0000*** 6.1295 0.0000*** 
0.300 0.302439 0.0298* 0.211778 0.1920 0.300 vs. 0.700 8.1255 0.0000*** 4.8109 0.0002*** 
0.400 0.317833 0.0253* 0.285878 0.0717* 0.400 vs. 0.600 8.2390 0.0000*** 4.5623 0.0008*** 
0.500 0.346725 0.0046** 0.344617 0.0500*      
0.600 0.397398 0.0086** 0.358703 0.0598*      
0.700 0.504704 0.0835* 0.489319 0.0155*      
0.800 0.506846 0.0058** 0.499620 0.0013**      
0.900 0.512381 0.0009*** 0.482446 0.0002***      
Notes: The right columns present the F tests of the equality of slope parameters across various quantiles. A rejection of the 
null hypothesis normally means that the magnitude of the slope coefficient appears different among the distinct parts of the 
return distribution; ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table A.3. Conditional 2SLS analysis within Bayesian quantile regression 
  Jordan Morocco 
 Quantile Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
        Pre-Arab Spring Post-Arab Spring Post-Arab Spring Post-Arab Spring 
Intercept 0.100 2.153407 0.7223 1.972924 0.6027 0.433859 0.1206 0.442182 0.4666 
 0.200 1.471841 0.1543 1.307250 0.2241 0.298494 0.3019 -0.413049 0.5342 
 0.300 1.996072 0.4839 1.799410 0.1527 0.374221 0.2264 0.202044 0.7959 
 0.400 1.939796 0.4979 1.598660 0.0967* 0.555738 0.1094 0.448472 0.6434 
 0.500 2.171076 0.5454 1.805435 0.3848 0.549282 0.2580 0.564293 0.4183 
 0.600 1.968038 0.2916 1.384811 0.2762 0.361926 0.3074 0.767622 0.1677 
 0.700 1.630551 0.0822* 1.619766 0.0942* 0.245893 0.5283 0.853686 0.0792* 
 0.800 1.670468 0.0651* 1.653318 0.0751* 0.171017 0.7574 0.823512 0.0730* 
 0.900 1.551312 0.2755 1.586478 0.3464 0.413087 0.5201 0.275015 0.6343 
SMGCC 0.100 0.111730 0.0045** 0.182808 0.0156* 0.084134 0.0000*** 0.502215 0.0000*** 
 0.200 0.139784 0.0264* 0.340819 0.0347* 0.075246 0.0000*** 0.554629 0.0000*** 
 0.300 0.150864 0.0001*** 0.375996 0.0003*** 0.091650 0.0000*** 0.596152 0.0000*** 
 0.400 0.191171 0.0061** 0.385896 0.0024** 0.180931 0.0074** 0.260885 0.0000*** 
 0.500 0.192774 0.0000*** 0.449251 0.0143* 0.117691 0.0600* 0.485880 0.0713* 
 0.600 0.196006 0.0000*** 0.452466 0.0105* 0.685586 0.1158 0.149065 0.8049 
 0.700 0.242624 0.0000*** 0.455666 0.0001*** 0.499803 0.2311 0.403252 0.4764 
 0.800 0.243380 0.0000*** 0.482874 0.0000*** 0.280303 0.4130 0.662083 0.2298 
 0.900 0.299639 0.0471* 0.514946 0.0939* 0.345617 0.7312 0.658024 0.1369 
INF 0.100 0.050906 0.1369 0.044338 0.0091** 0.278475 0.4342 0.474945 0.3904 
 0.200 0.044103 0.1587 0.029678 0.0323* -0.057504 0.7030 0.552627 0.0112* 
 0.300 0.066651 0.0246* 0.042884 0.0612* 0.018494 0.8969 0.753353 0.0033** 
 0.400 0.057291 0.0932* 0.032104 0.0206* 0.104631 0.4861 0.502841 0.1155 
 0.500 0.058727 0.0738* 0.031620 0.0619* 0.187972 0.0692* 0.662982 0.0394* 
 0.600 0.030412 0.4405 -0.002557 0.9450 0.217186 0.0757* 0.750723 0.0122* 
 0.700 0.010538 0.7587 0.010424 0.7571 0.225075 0.0800* 0.692038 0.0108* 
 0.800 0.010298 0.7425 0.007514 0.8069 0.220674 0.0782* 0.741179 0.0043** 
 0.900 0.031067 0.5940 0.048109 0.5308 0.274973 0.1037 0.783418 0.0019** 
IP 0.100 0.066096 0.1032 0.059613 0.0237* 0.241824 0.1008 0.815646 0.0006*** 
 0.200 0.051455 0.0974* 0.046909 0.0043** 0.016906 0.0253* 0.035777 0.0000*** 
 0.300 0.069291 0.0324* 0.041596 0.0629* 0.013484 0.0589* 0.031600 0.0001*** 
 0.400 0.058844 0.0588* 0.044677 0.1599 0.015174 0.0806* 0.032570 0.0644* 
 0.500 0.053201 0.1364 0.052061 0.1054 0.018811 0.0765* 0.028719 0.0487* 
 0.600 0.056009 0.1168 0.051960 0.0787* 0.020783 0.2536 0.026838 0.0453* 
 0.700 0.063755 0.0225* 0.062933 0.0215* 0.013161 0.0939* 0.022820 0.0480* 
 0.800 0.057752 0.0259* 0.059612 0.0166* 0.011179 0.2186 0.020502 0.0554* 
 0.900 -0.006873 0.5979 0.066948 0.0090** 0.009509 0.4326 0.020487 0.0287* 
IR 0.100 -0.020338 0.0158* 0.011360 0.8835 -0.016300 0.2255 -0.038978 0.0521* 
 0.200 0.024594 0.0663 -0.015108 0.0815* -0.006868 0.0000*** -0.011908 0.0198* 
 0.300 0.017501 0.3153 0.021267 0.2266 -0.005129 0.0000*** -0.009810 0.0818* 
 0.400 -0.012273 0.0000*** 0.019743 0.3319 -0.008054 0.2306 -0.017989 0.4514 
 0.500 -0.036196 0.0008*** -0.012904 0.0716* -0.011465 0.3053 -0.021097 0.2607 
 0.600 0.010686 0.6189 -0.009953 0.0790* -0.014879 0.4846 -0.019919 0.2824 
 0.700 0.010244 0.5965 0.010521 0.5899 -0.006728 0.3267 -0.016253 0.3525 
 0.800 0.009827 0.5417 0.009599 0.5528 -0.007369 0.4303 -0.012000 0.5502 
 0.900 0.007101 0.4838 0.007489 0.4698 -0.003786 0.8118 -0.021784 0.0784* 
Statistic tests of the equality of slope estimates across various quantiles 
 0.100 vs. 0.900 13.0867 0.0000*** 8.97315 0.0000*** 8.1926 0.0000*** 9.1045 0.0000*** 
 0.200 vs. 0.800 9.75142 0.0000*** 7.90264 0.0000*** 3.7615 0.0013** 5.6413 0.0001*** 
 0.300 vs. 0.700 11.0089 0.0000*** 10.0932 0.0000*** 5.0308 0.0007*** 3.8979 0.0013** 
 0.400 vs. 0.600 10.1852 0.0000*** 9.23556 0.0000*** 1.1205 0.0456* 7.6658 0.0000*** 
Notes: The right columns present the F tests of the equality of slope parameters across various quantiles. A rejection of the 
null hypothesis normally means that the magnitude of the slope coefficient appears different among the distinct parts of the 
return distribution; ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table A.4. Conditional 2SLS within Bayesian quantile regression (country-by-country
21
) 
  Jordan vs. Saudi Arabia Jordan vs. Qatar Morocco vs. Saudi Arabia Morocco vs. Qatar 
  Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
A.4.1. Without DV 
Intercept 0.100 0.013468 0.0000*** 0.014194 0.0000*** 0.082569 0.2709 -1.105733 0.0000*** 
 0.200 0.004958 0.0000*** 0.004720 0.0000*** 0.012612 0.0000*** -4.979415 0.0000*** 
 0.300 0.004044 0.0000*** 0.003927 0.0012** 0.007404 0.0000*** -4.637388 0.0000*** 
 0.400 0.003511 0.0001*** 0.003525 0.0008*** 0.006255 0.0216* -2.326691 0.0001*** 
 0.500 0.003766 0.3111 0.003558 0.0319* 0.006106 0.1711 -1.376532 0.2271 
 0.600 0.004267 0.9864 0.003758 0.9232 0.006195 0.8917 -0.136422 0.6374 
 0.700 0.005223 0.6630 0.004073 0.1485 0.005711 0.7015 0.384176 0.5299 
 0.800 0.004393 0.0524* 0.007511 0.0715* 0.006086 0.0713* 1.818655 0.0005*** 
 0.900 0.005979 0.0000*** 0.007704 0.0008*** 0.010743 0.0001*** 3.927513 0.0117* 
SM 0.100 0.242522 0.0058** 0.156379 0.7366 0.841326 0.9819 0.022772 0.1581 
 0.200 0.339962 0.0067** 0.245773 0.0019** 0.252376 0.9890 0.013834 0.0688* 
 0.300 0.395210 0.0012** 0.253922 0.0792* 0.006788 0.0059** 0.006446 0.0608* 
 0.400 0.392458 0.0008*** 0.324883 0.0804* 0.004471 0.0037** 0.007841 0.0439* 
 0.500 0.406152 0.0326* 0.292227 0.0373* 0.017907 0.0103*** 0.005896 0.4537 
 0.600 0.456288 0.0896* 0.237991 0.0085** 0.018069 0.0181*** 0.011845 0.5270 
 0.700 0.465024 0.0806* 0.288580 0.0395* 0.003653 0.0000***      0.004861 0.5786 
 0.800 0.467075 0.0709* 0.307237 0.0270* 0.003023 0.0000*** 0.005164 0.7909 
 0.900 0.467697 0.0418* 0.309123 0.0705* 0.019594 0.0000*** 0.008460 0.3745 
INF 0.100 0.362122 0.0015** 0.154845 0.1042 0.087474 0.0000*** 0.087678 0.0343* 
 0.200 0.032342 0.0001*** 0.043686 0.0000*** 0.003491 0.0525* 0.004848 0.0054** 
 0.300 0.056991 0.0000*** 0.139225 0.0000*** 0.121865 0.0366* 0.039634 0.0780* 
 0.400 0.221723 0.0000*** 0.144385 0.0000*** 0.102391 0.0605* 0.046674 0.0000*** 
 0.500 0.210738 0.0374* 0.154842 0.0001*** 0.162185 0.0887* 0.194450 0.0000*** 
 0.600 0.206702 0.6786 0.190144 0.0321* 0.172987 0.6183 0.149527 0.0000*** 
 0.700 0.194036 0.2240 0.194108 0.0754* 0.203515 0.6285 01484980 0.0000*** 
 0.800 0.242219 0.6781 0.124815 0.2666 0.161378 0.3310 0.175722 0.4966 
 0.900 0.112509 0.7320 0.186274 0.5618 0.164258 0.8810 0.172359 0.2374 
IP 0.100 0.053231 0.0914* 0.040459 0.0830* 0.007898 0.0854* 0.028407 0.0299* 
 0.200 0.038474 0.0085** 0.042881 0.0099** 0.013651 0.0950* 0.098757 0.0838* 
 0.300 0.039783 0.0694* 0.038511 0.0767* 0.003495 0.0672* 0.078562 0.1483 
 0.400 0.068142 0.0880* 0.043224 0.0261* 0.093022 0.1190 0.083333 0.0668* 
 0.500 0.003345 0.0698* 0.049042 0.0532* 0.080659 0.0931* 0.016149 0.0414* 
 0.600 0.050883 0.0939* 0.098765 0.0940* 0.068428 0.0603* 0.006986 0.0282* 
 0.700 0.015178 0.0885* 0.068939 0.0116* 0.092637 0.0490* 0.001013 0.0017** 
 0.800 0.019590 0.0795* 0.085682 0.0000*** 0.038678 0.0124* 0.009593 0.0000*** 
 0.900 0.166883 0.0430* 0.024527 0.0624* 0.097026 0.0599* 0.006341 0.0075** 
IR 0.100 -0.069354 0.0000*** 0.188822 0.2456 -0.009189 0.1567 -0.009284 0.0356* 
 0.200 -0.003235 0.0000*** -0.003393 0.0000*** -0.001057 0.1000 -0.002916 0.0097** 
 0.300 -0.003737 0.0241* -0.007646 0.0225* -0.005555 0.0143* -0.005008 0.0013** 
 0.400 -0.123548 0.8012 -0.008740 0.0012** -0.025872 0.1278 -0.009520 0.1066 
 0.500 -0.072029 0.7700 -0.009373 0.0000*** -0.003665 0.0016** -0.011881 0.1052 
 0.600 0.030231 0.7052 -0.046168 0.3567 -0.007964 0.0009*** -0.015664 0.2384 
 0.700 0.041377 0.2345 -0.005693 0.4128 -0.004907 0.0101* -0.007624 0.0008*** 
 0.800 0.028262 0.6567 -0.011530 0.2911 -0.007484 0.7125 -0.007414 0.0000*** 
 0.900 -0.005678 0.0038** -0.008687 0.0009*** -0.003629 0.0311* -0.008667 0.1516 
Statistic tests of the equality of slope estimates across various quantiles 
 0.100 vs. 0.900 5.8976 0.0003*** 6.7893 0.0000*** 1.2856 0.0413* 4.3589 0.0013** 
 0.200 vs. 0.800 4.7655 0.0010** 4.0821 0.0045** 0.1567 0.5879 2.8976 0.0176* 
 0.300 vs. 0.700 4.5129 0.0019** 4.5187 0.0018*** 2.0671 0.0286* 5.9412 0.0000*** 
 0.400 vs. 0.600 9.0157 0.0000*** 2.2303 0.0657* 7.1234 0.0000*** 8.1143 0.0000*** 
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 The Table contains only the results of Saudi Arabia and Qatar vs. Jordan and then Morocco. We choose Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar to ensure the robustness of our results, since we note greater correlations between these 
countries and Jordan and Morocco when using DCC-GARCH and smoothed probabilities (MS). The findings of 
the rest of GCC countries can be obtained upon request. 
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 (Continued)                                                                                            A.4.2. With DV 
Intercept 0.100 -0.068153 0.0022** 0.009487 0.1566 0.022191 0.0000*** 0.013134 0.0000*** 
 0.200 -0.035401 0.0003*** 0.005043 0.0000*** 0.010749 0.0000*** 0.010077 0.0000*** 
 0.300 -0.025107 0.0123* 0.004078 0.0005*** 0.007418 0.0003*** 0.005305 0.0000*** 
 0.400 -0.017354 0.0000 0.003772 0.0000*** 0.006536 0.1117 0.005355 0.0000*** 
 0.500 -0.009281 0.0186* 0.004175 0.0000** 0.006729 0.5053 0.006179 0.0273* 
 0.600 -0.003666 0.4516 0.003741 0.7019 0.006782 0.7124 0.005715 0.3283 
 0.700 -0.001535 0.0022** 0.003623 0.5538 0.006060 0.7106 0.005307 0.6722 
 0.800 0.011431 0.0017** 0.004330 0.2894 0.006190 0.0045** 0.005775 0.0089** 
 0.900 0.034042 0.0000*** 0.008440 0.3512 0.031164 0.0002** 0.132975 0.0001*** 
SM 0.100 0.380771 0.0000*** 0.278697 0.0000*** 0.316349 0.0212* 0.249444 0.0000*** 
 0.200 0.390712 0.0000*** 0.282417 0.0000*** 0.295309 0.7585 0.259431 0.0306*** 
 0.300 0.394463 0.0000*** 0.302401 0.0000*** 0.199246 0.8245 0.204333 0.0302*** 
 0.400 0.478831 0.0012** 0.362581 0.0008*** 0.217139 0.0114* 0.331049 0.4466 
 0.500 0.482440 0.0004*** 0.383024 0.0002*** 0.315879 0.0897* 0.281963 0.3267 
 0.600 0.489257 0.0615* 0.448184 0.0001*** 0.355492 0.0000*** 0.203502 0.6545 
 0.700 0.502149 0.0323* 0.464753 0.0019** 0.374675 0.0590* 0.223118 0.6788 
 0.800 0.566668 0.0267* 0.471922 0.0100* 0.401856 0.9605 0.272359 0.8637 
 0.900 0.573647 0.0091** 0.497488 0.0004*** 0.452569 0.0373* 0.340701 0.1358 
INF 0.100 0.064090 0.0135* 0.001815 0.0000*** 0.223124 0.5622 0.056463 0.2560 
 0.200 0.179874 0.0006*** 0.082419 0.0000*** 0.107099 0.0111* 0.079899 0.0003*** 
 0.300 0.128088 0.0000*** 0.018527 0.0010** 0.127938 0.0013** 0.045375 0.0009*** 
 0.400 0.087153 0.0000*** 0.114287 0.0008*** 0.313980 0.0006*** 0.025757 0.0007*** 
 0.500 0.211909 0.2650 0.215568 0.0113* 0.213312 0.0263* 0.180557 0.0372* 
 0.600 0.059439 0.1578 0.132622 0.0002*** 0.113890 0.0450* 0.098699 0.0190* 
 0.700 0.055571 0.2361 0.133987 0.0000*** 0.211849 0.0761* 0.117370 0.0369* 
 0.800 0.028361 0.0021** 0.164967 0.0015** 0.114761 0.0644* 0.023429 0.1189 
 0.900 0.183045 0.0009*** 0.122235 0.0006*** 0.259174 0.1561 0.152373 0.0717* 
IP 0.100 0.060574 0.1098 0.053181 0.1562 0.003612 0.0658* 0.037265 0.0364* 
 0.200 0.008574 0.0013** 0.006191 0.0000*** 0.007290 0.0716* 0.006377 0.0308* 
 0.300 0.006593 0.0025** 0.052336 0.0034** 0.055337 0.9056 0.001085 0.0007*** 
 0.400 0.007890 0.0012** 0.003129 0.0026** 0.065635 0.3626 0.003985 0.0099** 
 0.500 0.002166 0.0009*** 0.007783 0.0103* 0.090484 0.0768* 0.020379 0.2035 
 0.600 0.007515 0.0046** 0.002373 0.0017** 0.001102 0.0013** 0.051499 0.0001*** 
 0.700 0.006168 0.0132* 0.005301 0.0033** 0.006417 0.0040** 0.033296 0.0001*** 
 0.800 0.006009 0.0198* 0.008464 0.0016** 0.002487 0.0000*** 0.013480 0.0000*** 
 0.900 0.007844 0.0023** 0.010611 0.0009*** 0.015307 0.0000*** 0.007913 0.0000*** 
IR 0.100 0.214661 0.6782 -0.139004 0.3568 -1.187166 0.5789 0.210927 0.5431 
 0.200 0.056957 0.5007 -0.649503 0.4297 -0.008205 0.0505* 0.029095 0.7612 
 0.300 0.019005 0.2833 -0.374206 0.1865 -0.005012 0.0078** 0.013421 0.4862 
 0.400 -0.007830 0.0041** -0.001485 0.0057** -1.454321 0.3481 -0.005826 0.0713* 
 0.500 -0.360308 0.2891 -0.007354 0.0029** -1.848865 0.1623 -0.002637 0.0419* 
 0.600 -0.003700 0.0000*** -0.005045 0.0010** -0.006169 0.0014** -0.004800 0.0083** 
 0.700 -0.005239 0.0003*** -0.100674 0.5014 -2.219672 0.5021 -0.638946 0.7812 
 0.800 -0.001404 0.0017** -0.016015 0.0765* -3.203858 0.3215 -0.002906 0.0004*** 
 0.900 -0.152716 0.2835 -0.010548 0.1000 -0.006138 0.0009*** -0.073248 0.1056 
DV 0.100 -0.183490 0.2355 1.187477 0.7983 -0.004260 0.0056** -0.003898 0.0000*** 
 0.200 -0.019172 0.0000*** -0.027889 0.0362* -0.003053 0.0567* -0.002391 0.0054** 
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 0.300 -0.157114 0.1983 0.201193 0.8140 -0.001511 0.0072** -0.009463 0.0011** 
 0.400 -0.061112 0.0021** -0.006238 0.0003*** -0.005807 0.02134 -0.008566 0.0002*** 
 0.500 -0.022648 0.0005*** -0.075698 0.0000*** -0.003716 0.0002*** -0.004126 0.0000*** 
 0.600 -0.079832 0.0000*** -0.010716 0.1146 -0.002465 0.0018** -0.002110 0.0000*** 
 0.700 -0.023691 0.0004*** -0.017636 0.1000 0.629801 0.7655 0.001972 0.3540 
 0.800 -0.639844 0.1108 -0.008369 0.0012** 3.548711 0.9812 0.016664 0.2217 
 0.900 -0.033568 0.0000*** -0.008275 0.0001*** 2.557436 0.7832 0.049895 0.1069 
Statistic tests of the equality of slope estimates across various quantiles 
 0.100 vs. 0.900 10.0326 0.0000*** 8.1456 0.0011** 7.1235 0.0000*** 8.1345 0.0000*** 
 0.200 vs. 0.800 9.1876 0.0000*** 3.9211 0.0303* 0.6318 0.2540 4.7966 0.0013** 
 0.300 vs. 0.700 9.2345 0.0000*** 5.5190 0.0002*** 6.4522 0.0000*** 0.3433 0.5617 
 0.400 vs. 0.600 6.1909 0.0000** 7.5441 0.0000*** 5.8213 0.0001*** 5.0011 0.0007*** 
Notes: The right columns present the F tests of the equality of slope parameters across various quantiles. A rejection of the 
null hypothesis normally means that the magnitude of the slope coefficient appears different among the distinct parts of the 
return distribution; ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Figure A.4. 2SLS within Bayesian quantile process estimates 
Jordan vs. GCC Morocco  vs. GCC 
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